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The Family Affinities of Common-Law and
Civil-Law Legal Systems
By CRAIG M. LAWSON*
A.B., Yale University, 1970; JD., University of California, Hastings College
of the Law, 1974" Associate Professor, College of Law, University of Ne-
braska-Lincoin.
I. INTRODUCTION
Comparative lawyers have devised many schemes to group the
world's legal systems into families according to their similarities and
dissimilarities. This taxonomic debate has been one of the staples of
modem comparative scholarship. Although the debate seems at times
abstruse, disputes over classification are nonetheless important, since
they result in structures of thought which greatly influence the ways
foreign legal systems are studied and understood.
There is general agreement among comparatists in characterizing
common law and civil law as two distinct groups within the handful of
major families of legal systems in the world today.' The historical and
geographical importance of the common-law and civil-law families is
certainly not to be denied. What is doubtful is their independence. Re-
cent comparative scholarship has so clearly underlined the convergence
of common law and civil law and has shown them to be so fundamen-
tally alike that it is time to re-examine2 whether these two families
* The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance provided by the Win-
throp and Frances Lane Foundation of Omaha, Nebraska.
1. See generally R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY (2d ed. 1978). All references herein are to a more recent French edition of Ren6
David's great treatise, R. DAVID, LEs GRANDFS SYST MES DE DROrr CONTE.MPoRAINS (8th
rev. ed. C. Jauffret-Spinosi 1982) [hereinafter cited as DAVID]. Translations from this work
and from other foreign works are the author's, unless otherwise noted.
2. Most recent surveys accept common law and civil law as distinct major families of
legal systems, see, ag., 1 P. ARMINJON, B. NOLDE & M. WOLFF, TRAtTL DE DROIT COM-
PARE (1950); DAVID, supra note 1; 1 K. ZWEIGERT & H. K6TZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COM-
PARATIVE LAW: THE FRAMEWORK (1977) [hereinafter cited as ZWEIGERT & K6Trz], but it
has occasionally been suggested that both actually belong to a larger occidental family. See,
ag., R. DAVID, TRArrA ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARE 224 (1950); David, Deux
Conceptions de L'Ordre Social, in I Ius PRIVATUM GENTIUM: FEs'rscIIRHr FOR MAX
RHEJNSTEIN 53 (E. Von Caemmerer, S. Mentschikoff & K. Zweigert eds. 1969) [hereinafter
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might not better be joined as two distinct branches of a single larger
group of legal systems, the Western liberal democratic legal family.3
II. TAXONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY
LEGAL SYSTEMS
Comparatists do not agree on the criteria for grouping legal sys-
tems into a global order. Indeed, several major obstacles to the com-
parison and grouping of entire legal systems4 are readily apparent.
One obstacle is the high degree of internal specialization characteristic
of all the world's contemporary legal systems. As a result, two legal
systems may belong in the same group when one set of their institutions
is compared, but they may belong in different groups when another set
of institutions is compared. For example, the comparison of Anglo-
American and European private law yields three groups: a common-
law family, a Romanistic legal family, and a Germanic legal family.
The comparison of their constitutional law results in only two groups,
not the traditional common-law and civil-law groups, but rather one
group comprising systems which possess institutions exercising judicial
control over the constitutionality of law and another group whose
cited as Deux Conceptions]; Malmstr(5m, The System of Legal Systems.- Notes on a Problem
of Classfication in Comparative Law, 13 SCAND. STUD. IN LAw 129 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Malmstrom]. In the interest of brevity, the scope of this Article is limited to the author's
own taxonomic arguments for positing the existence of a family of Western legal systems.
The Article does not contrast the somewhat different views of Professor David and Dean
Malmstram on this subject.
3. The position taken in this Article cannot for reasons of space be exhaustively de-
fended here. Rather, the position taken is meant to renew the debate among comparatists on
the subject and to stimulate thought on such topics as the structural influence of concepts
and terminology on Western legal families.
The name, "Western liberal democratic legal family," was chosen because it encom-
passes the modem Western conception of law and important elements of the history of com-
mon law and civil law. No attempt has been made here, however, to define the complete
membership of the family or its internal subgroups. Other legal scholars, while not ex-
pressly recognizing the existence of a Western family, have suggested subgroupings for the
Western legal systems. For example, Professor David's categories include the Anglo-Ameri-
can, Romano-Germanic, and a hybrid of either or both. DAVID, supra note 1, at 23-26.
Zweigert and K6tz divide the West into common-law, Romanistic, Germanic, and Nordic
families. ZWEiGERT & K6Tz, supra note 2, at 63. Malmstr~m, on the other hand, proposes
the following occidental subdivisions: the occidental family of continental (European) legal
systems; the Latin American family of legal systems; the Nordic family of legal systems; and
the common-law family of legal systems. Malmstr~m, supra note 2, at 147.
4. The comparison of entire groups of legal systems is often referred to as macrocom-
parison, a term sometimes used in this Article, in contrast with microcomparison, the com-
parative study of particular legal institutions, doctrines, or other parts of legal systems. See
Rheinstein, Legal Systems: Comparative Law andLegal Systems, in IX INTERNATIONAL EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 204, 207-09 (1968).
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members possess no such institutions. 5
A second obstacle is the evolving focus of comparative legal schol-
arship. Since different generations of comparative lawyers have differ-
ent interests, one would expect them also to have different intuitive
pictures of the legal systems which they study. In addition, legal sys-
tems are continually changing, although this process will probably alter
the microscopic terms of comparison more quickly than it alters the
macroscopic groupings of any global taxonomy. Glanvil in the twelfth
century and Bracton in the thirteenth century recognized that the leges
Anglicanae and the leges Romanae differed fundamentally. By the
fifteenth century in England, there was a distinct sense of rivalry be-
tween the common law and Roman law.' The modem comparison of
common law and civil law has inherited the larger features of this early
sense of distinction, although the finer terms of the comparison have no
doubt changed. A final obstacle is that any taxonomy of legal systems
must schematically simplify these systems for the sake of manageabil-
ity, and the more simple picture may be less accurate7
Despite these obstacles, the complexity of the world's legal systems
that makes taxonomy difficult also makes it important. The world's
legal systems are so numerous and diverse that they require analytical
frameworks to facilitate understanding and study. Thus, the major
purpose of any global taxonomy is to organize knowledge of foreign
law into a workable order. To suit that purpose, one must find a taxon-
omy which compares fundamental features-those which are more
likely to be enduring and widely dispersed-and features which
broadly represent the range of laws and institutions within a legal sys-
tem. In selecting representative features, one aims for relative com-
pleteness, depth, and longevity.
What features of legal systems most clearly define these systems
and allow them to be grouped on the basis of their similarities and
differences? There is no widely accepted answer to this question. Nev-
5. ZWEIGERT & K6i"z, supra note 2, at 59; see also Malmstram, supra note 2, at 139
n.2. On the subject of classifying institutions of judicial review, see generally M. CAPP.-
LEmT, JuDicIAL REviEw IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971).
6. Professor Radin raised this contention. Radin, The Rivalry of Common.Law and
Civil-Law Ideas in the American Colonies, in 2 LAw: A CENTURY oF PROGRESS 1835-1935,
at 404, 404-05 (1937). See also M. RADN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HSTORY 115-16
(1936).
7. The approach to taxonomy taken in this Article draws together most of the impor-
tant topics of modem macrocomparative debate. Like other approaches to taxonomy, it is
pluralistic, but unlike others, it ranks the criteria of classification according to their order of
importance. See ZWEIGERT & K6Tz, supra note 2, at 61-66; Malmstram, supra note 2, at
130, 142-44.
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ertheless, one can select several descriptive elements which often ap-
pear in macrocomparative surveys. These elements, in their
approximate order of importance, are: history, conception of law,
structural elements of the formal system of laws, and institutional ele-
ments of the legal system.
A. History
The pre-eminent current surveys of the world's legal systems, Les
Grandes Systbmes de Drolt Contemporains,8 by Ren6 David, and An In-
troduction to Comparative Law L The Framework,9 by Konrad
Zweigert and Hein Kbtz, both begin their descriptions of common-law
and civil-law families'0 with summaries of their histories. Most other
comparatists approve," because major legal traditions are products of
their histories. Every generation of lawyers receives its legal order
from the past, shaped by forces that are now largely historical. Few
generations are given the opportunity to consciously refashion their en-
tire legal order, and even those few are strongly influenced by the his-
tory of the legal order which they have undertaken to remake. Thus,
history is probably the most important single factor shaping legal
culture.
Although history may reveal the forces that have shaped contem-
porary legal systems and may alert us to a legal system's most enduring
features, history is not properly a part of contemporary legal systems.
History is only the starting point of comparative taxonomy. Contem-
porary legal systems may come to resemble one another so closely that
we are forced to group them together despite major differences in their
histories.
8. DAvID, supra note 1.
9. ZWEIGERT & KcTz, supra note 2.
10. Professor David does not use the term civil law to refer to the continental Western
European legal systems. Zweigert and Kotz use the term but only infrequently. They do
not group all these legal systems together, but rather separate the Romanistic legal family,
ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 2, at 68-132, whose leading members are France and Italy,
from the Germanic legal family, id at 133-89, whose leading members are Germany, Aus-
tria, and Switzerland. David treats all these systems as a single group, but chooses the name
"Romano-Germanic legal family" to call attention to the shared contributions which
Romanistic thought and Germanic legal science have made to the development of the fam-
ily, DAVID, supra note 1, at 23 n.l. Legal scholars writing in English, when discussing these
Western European legal systems use the terms civil law and continental law. Since the refer-
ence to the non-Marxist continental legal systems is clear, this practice is followed herein,
The reader should therefore understand that the terms Romano-Germanic legal family, civil
law, and continental law are for purposes of this Article interchangeable and that each term
refers to Zweigert and Kotz's Romanistic and Germanic legal families grouped as one.
11. See, e.g., MalmstrOm, supra note 2, at 144.
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B. Conception of Law
If certain legal institutions, structures of thought, and attitudes
about law persist long enough, their characteristics seem to be gradu-
ally absorbed into society's underlying set of assumptions about the na-
ture of law and its role in organizing social life. 2 Taken collectively,
this set of fundamental assumptions about law constitutes a particular
culture's conception of law and powerfully influences the life of the law
in that culture.
13
The phrase "conception of law" is commonly used 4 to describe a
set of predominant attitudes and assumptions about the nature of law
and the role of law in regulating social behavior. It is a somewhat
misleading term in that it suggests an idea consciously entertained,
when in fact most members of a culture may never consciously have
formulated the ideas and attitudes described as constituting their cul-
tural conception of law. The term also suggests a spurious singleness of
idea; in fact, a culture's attitude toward law is complex, being com-
posed of assumptions not always consistent with one another, and no
single set of assumptions about law can ever obtain the unanimous ad-
herence of all members of a particular culture. Even so, certain funda-
mental attitudes toward law will have been predominant and
historically deep-rooted.
Individuals in a particular culture generally come to accept that
law should possess certain characteristics, play a certain social role, and
embody certain values. History is our clearest indicator' of a culture's
conception of law: those themes which have endured the longest in a
12. As Professor Adda Bozeman has put it. "The successive generations of any given
society will be inclined to think in traditionally preferred grooves, to congregate around
certain constant, change-resistant themes, and to rebut, whether intentionally or uncon-
sciously, contrary ideas intruding from without." A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A
MULTICULTURAL WORLD 14 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BOZEMAN]. Professor Bozeman's
discussion, "Cultures and Modes of Thought," id at 14-33, is a particularly good general
discussion of the way in which culture is largely a civilization's way of thinking. The larger
work, The Future of Law in a Multicultural World, is perhaps the single best survey compar-
ing conceptions of law and political order in the world today.
13. For an illustrative discussion of the traditional Japanese conception of law and
many of the ways that conception has shaped contemporary Japanese law, see Kim & Law-
son, he Law of the Subtle Mind- The Traditional Japanese Conception of Law, 28 IN'L &
COMP. L.Q. 491 (1979).
14. See, eg., The Dfferent Conceptions of the Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIvE LAW (R. David ed. 1975); Driberg, he African Conception of Law, 16 J.
COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 230 (3d ser. 1934). Professor Yosiyuki Noda has used the term
"attitude to law" to mean approximately the same thing. Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAP-
ANESE LAW 159-83 (1976). Professors Zweigert and Katz use the more ambiguous term
"ideology" in roughly the same sense. ZWEICERT & K6Tz, supra note 2, at 66-67.
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particular legal system are most likely to have become part of a cul-
ture's assumptions about law. Unlike history, conception of law is very
much a part of the contemporary legal order-perhaps the most funda-
mental part, for it will color all the workings of the legal order. For
example, the Japanese legal system is formally quite like Western legal
systems, yet in practice quite unlike them, because the Japanese con-
ception of law causes the Japanese to use law differently than Wes-
terners would.' 5 Because conception of law orients lawyer and
nonlawyer alike to the legal system, it is impossible to accurately de-
scribe a legal family without taking it into account.
C. Formal Elements of the Legal System
16
The formal system of enforceable rules which constitutes the posi-
tive law is perhaps the most obvious factor in the comparison of legal
systems, yet individual rules of law have meant almost nothing in or-
ganizing legal systems into larger groups. Comparatists have often re-
marked that the multinational study of individual legal doctrines
discloses that different legal systems frequently give strikingly similar
answers to specific problems and differ more in their larger elements,
such as categories, divisions, concepts, and techniques. 17 Zweigert and
K6tz, however, have observed that no striking convergence of legal
rules is found when studying areas of law affected by strong political or
moral values.'8 The commonly observed convergence is limited to "ar-
eas of law which are more technical and morally more neutral." 9
Are many areas of law truly "neutral" in any global sense? Are
there areas of law which either have not been influenced by fundamen-
15. Kim & Lawson, supra note 13, at 506-13.
16. It is difficult to know whether the formal elements or the institutional elements of
legal systems are more important in the characterization of legal systems for taxonomic
purposes. Scholars differ on the relative importance of these fundamental elements. Max
Rheinstein, for example, agreed with Max Weber that more than anything else, a legal
system was impressed with the character of its professional elites, whom Weber called the
honoratiores of the law. Rheinstein, supra note 4, at 208-09. Each factor is an essential part
of every contemporary legal system, and neither can be said to leave a more distinctive mark
on the legal system than the other. Without attempting to resolve this question of priority,
formal elements of the legal system will be examined first.
17. See, ag., Lipstein, UIn Jurisle Anglais das la Communaud' EurOplene, 30 REvua
INTERNATIONALE DE DROrr COMPARA [R.I.D.C.] 493 (1978). Cf. de Vries & Lowenfeld,
Jurisdiction in PersonalActions-4 Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 IOWA L. REV. 306
(1959) ("In this area of law [4e., bases of personal jurisdiction: domicile, nationality, pres-
ence of property, etc.] differences among civil-law countries are as great as differences be-
tween civil-law and common-law countries"). Id at 344.
18. ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 2, at 31.
19. 1d
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tal social, political, moral, economic, or religious values or rest on as-
sumptions so universally accepted as to be considered neutral or
incontestable? If all the legal systems belonging to a major legal family
rest on a common conception of law, one would expect that the funda-
mental assumptions underlying individual rules and doctrines would
also be commonly held, resulting in this observed similarity of legal
rules. As one progresses to the study of legal systems belonging to dif-
ferent legal cultures, one should find greater divergence between un-
derlying political, economic, social, moral, and religious assumptions,
fewer "morally neutral" or "technical" areas of law (in Zweigert and
K6tz's terms), and therefore a greater diversity of legal rules and doc-
trines. This diversity suggests that one might use the comparison of
individual rules and doctrines as a touchstone of taxonomy. Certain
obstacles, however, exist. On the one hand, to rest a macrocomparative
survey on microcomparative studies ranging over entire legal systems
would be impossibly cumbersome. On the other hand, to compare only
a limited number of rules and doctrines would be less valuable because
rules and doctrines are the least enduring and most superficial elements
of legal systems.
For these reasons the repeated observation of convergence be-
tween the rules and doctrines of two legal systems might serve as a
valuable clue suggesting their membership in a common legal family
and encouraging scrutiny of the larger, more permanent elements of
each legal system. Nevertheless, taxonomic surveys should rely upon
broader elements and not upon microcomparative studies. The ele-
ments which comparatists have most often selected for this purpose are
structural: the major divisions or branches of a body of laws, its funda-
mental or pervasive concepts, and its terminology. 2° These structural
elements of every body of laws which shape the legal culture of jurists
are invaluable indices of the family to which a legal system belongs.
D. Institutional Elements
Since legal systems employ distinctive institutions to formulate
and apply their legal standards, it is imperative to consider institutional
elements. The phrase "institutional elements" describes the animating
forces in a legal system. Some of these are institutions in the usual
sense--courts, legislatures, associations of lawyers, and others. The
20. See, eg., DAVID, supra note 1, at 16-18, 20-21. See generally Sticture and the Didi-
sions of the Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw (IL David ed.
1974).
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processes in the institutional setting must also be considered. Finally,
there are the attitudes and modes of thought of the jurists who fill these
institutions. How are they trained? How are they organized? Most
important of all, what is their professional legal tradition?2
No two legal systems will be perfectly matched in terms of history,
conception of law, structure of laws, and institutional features. If it can
be said, however, that the similarities between two legal systems out-
weigh the differences, that the differences are more superficial and rest
on a common legal ground, then both legal systems should be put in
the same group, and the legal family to which they belong should be
described accordingly.
III. HISTORY OF COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
Although distinct from one another, the histories of common law
and civil law show similarities in their larger outlines and a striking
convergence during the last two or three centuries. On the basis of
their histories alone, they may be seen as distinct subgroups of a larger
Western liberal democratic legal tradition.
The histories of common law and civil law have diverged in some
important respects. Civil law never knew a set of rules akin to equity
or any court system akin to Chancery.2 z The Romanistic ius commune
was never received into common law as it was into the various Euro-
pean laws in the sixteenth century. Consequently, the common-law
lawyer is less conscious of a Roman law heritage than is the European
lawyer.
Of the many bodies of law competing for position in English legal
21. A legal tradition, as the term applies, is not a set of rules of law about contracts,
corporations, and crimes, although such rules will almost always be in some sense a
reflection of that tradition. Rather it is a set of deeply rooted, historically condi-
tioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the
polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about
the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught. The
legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expres-
sion. It puts the legal system into cultural perspective.
J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MERRYMAN]. Pro-
fessor Merryman's definition of legal tradition approaches the definition of conception of
law discussed in the text, but his brilliant description of the civil-law tradition seems to be a
description more of the deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes of European law-
yers, than of deep historical attitudes of the European people.
22. Many scholars have singled out equity as one of the unique features of common
law. See, e.g., ZWEIGERT & K6Tz, supra note 2, at 196-200; Weir, Structure and Divisions of
the Law: III. The Common Law System, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPAR-
ATIVE LAW 77, 80 (R. David ed. 1974).
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history, the common law which developed in the royal courts gradually
displaced even equity, its most important rival. On the Continent,
however, the law administered by the royal courts gradually gave way
to the Romanistic law formulated by academic jurists. The common-
law forms of action, reminiscent of the ancient Roman system of ac-
tiones,13 were critical to the development of the common law, yet there
was no European equivalent. In its academic setting, the developing
European Jus commune had a substantive focus quite unlike the proce-
dural focus of English law. The nineteenth-century ideal of codifica-
tion involved setting forth the law in a rational and systematic way,
eliminating the disorganization and archaism of traditional law and es-
tablishing the natural rights under the protection of an enlightened sov-
ereign. This ideal produced no codes in England, whereas it
completely changed the character of Continental law.
Yet in important respects the histories of common law and civil
law have been closely parallel, even interlacing, since the twelfth cen-
tury. Since the eighteenth century they have increasingly converged to
the point that their characteristic historical differences have now largely
been bridged.
A. Medieval Law
The history of modem law in both England and Europe alike be-
gins in the High Middle Ages. Although the strong centralized feudal
hierarchy of Norman England had no parallel on the Continent, where
the regional aristocracy was relatively more powerful, the medieval
idea of a society ordered through law infected English thought as
deeply as it did Continental thought.24 Vacarius, an Italian teaching
Roman law at Oxford during the mid-twelfth century, and Azo, an
English Romanist who exerted great influence upon Bracton in the
mid-thirteenth century, were among the internationally preeminent
glossators25 Although Bracton's De Legibus et ConsuetudinibusAngliae
was properly a work on English law, it was strikingly influenced by
Roman law, especially in its larger divisions, legal definitions, and ba-
sic theories,26 and served to transmit some Romanistic thought to Eng-
23. See Stein, Logic and Experience in .Ronan and Conunon Law, 59 B.U.L REV. 433
(1979).
24. P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 43-70 (1929);see general , F.
KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGEs (1956).
25. T. PLUCKNErT, A CONCISE HIsTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th ed. 1956) [herein-
after cited as PLUCKNETr].
26. Thorne, Translator's Introduction, in 1 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
1982]
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land. As Holdsworth pointed out, Bracton's work was analogous to the
work of the glossators proceeding contemporaneously on the conti-
nent.2 7 In their brief summary of the main characteristics of medieval
English law, Pollock and Maitland effectively captured its similarities
to contemporaneous French law:
Of course one main characteristic of English medieval law is that it is
medieval. It has much in common with its sisters, more especially
with its French sisters. Bracton might have travelled through France
and talked with lawyers whom he met without hearing of much that
was unintelligible or very surprising. And yet English law had dis-
tinctive features. Chief among these, if we are not mistaken, was a
certain stem and rugged simplicity. . . . Gladly would we have had
before us a judgment passed by some French contemporary on the
law that is stated by Glanvill and Bracton. The illustrious bairi of
Clermont, Philippe de Remi, sire de Beaumanoir, lawyer and poet,
may have been in England when he was a boy; he sang of England
and English earls and the bad French that they talked. If he had
come here when he was older, when he was writing his Coutumes,
what would he have said of English law? Much would have been
familiar to him; he would have read with ease our Latin plea rolls,
hesitating now and again over some old English word such as
sochemannus; the Anglo-French of our lawyers, though it would
have pained his poet's ear, was not yet so bad that he would have
needed an interpreter, hardly an idea would have been strange to
him.
2 8
Perhaps not until the present day were common law and civil law (es-
pecially the law of France) to resemble one another so closely as they
did from the mid-eleventh to the mid-thirteenth centuries.
B. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries
Holdsworth's comparison of English and European law in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries describes the increasingly divergent
development of each against their common social background in West-
em history,2 9 allowing us to see the role of law both in the emergence
of the modem state from the medieval social order and in the increas-
ENGLAND 51 (1968). See also SELECT PASSAGES FROM THE WORKS OF BRACTON AND AzO
(F. Maitland ed. 1895).
27. 2 W. HOLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 270 (rev. 3d ed. 1923).
28. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD 445-46 (2d ed. 1898; reissued with intro, by S. Milsom 1968).
29. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 223-25 (1924) [hereinafler cited
as 4 HOLDSWORTH].
[Vol, 6
Common Law and Civil Law
ing ascendancy of the mercantile order. During this period in England
and on the Continent, the law hardened into particular rules of practice
and styles of legal thinking that were the property of a professional
class of jurists.30 Of course this similarity further reinforced the grow-
ing differences between common law and civil law by making each less
flexible and less susceptible to change. Even so, in England and Eu-
rope alike, "the law has a double aspect. In its rules are contained not
only the civil and criminal law of the state, but also such constitutional
and political theories as the state possesses. In both cases these theories
become very important in the law of the future."31 The absence in
England of an authoritative text, however, and the development of the
law through decided cases, rather than through the commtnis opinio
doctorum (the consensus of scholars), is a major contrast dating to this
period32 and has important lingering effects in common law and civil
law today.
C. The Sixteenth Century
During the sixteenth century in England, there was also a minor
reception of Roman law somewhat like the major formal reception oc-
curring contemporaneously on the Continent. In several important ar-
eas the authority of civil law was formally recognized. Doctors'
Commons, the professional organization of the English civilians, was
similar to the Inns of Court, although it was more recently estab-
lished.3 The development of new courts and councils administering
supplementary or rival bodies of law-almost all of them strongly Ro-
man-influenced-was one of the ways English medieval legal and
political ideas were adapted to the needs of the modem state.
Another adaptation occurred within the common law itself. Com-
mon-law lawyers turned again to the older books of authority, above
all to Glanvil, Bracton, Britton, and Fleta, whose medieval English
texts showed a heavy Roman influence.' On the Continent, civil-law
lawyers were under the same imperative to resolve the legal problems
of a new world,
a world in which the growth of a capitalistic organization, both of
foreign trade and of domestic industry, was breaking up the medie-
val guilds, and the medieval agricultural arrangements based on the
30. Id at 223.
31. Id at 224.
32. Id at 224-25.
33. Id at 236-39.
34. Id at 285-86.
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manor and feudal tie between lord and tenant; a world in which the
competition between the several states of modem Europe empha-
sized the need to organize all industry, agricultural or commercial,
with a view to national power. . ..35
The civil-law lawyers found the intellectual equipment for their mod-
ernization in the work of their medieval forebears,36 as did the English.
As a result, the glossators' medieval legal thought and that of their
English contemporaries, who so strikingly resembled them, dominated
both the private and the constitutional law of the Renaissance as well
as its political theory in England and on the Continent. Holdsworth
summarizes as follows:
England, it is true, retained her common law; but that common law
was, like the Roman law which the sixteenth century received,
formed amidst medieval ideas, and it was supplemented by rules and
principles, the addition of which was due to the same causes as those
which had brought about the continental Reception. Though, there-
fore, English law was fundamentally unlike that of the continent, it
was sufficiently akin to render possible a science of comparative
law.37
D. Common Legal History
Both in England and on the Continent, legal history reflected the
history of Western civilization. Although the histories of common law
and civil law did indeed diverge, they drew from a fund of distinctly
Western legal ideas. Even their divergent elements were by and large
comparable. Western law accommodated itself to such social changes
as the growth of a complex feudal social order, the gradual dissolution
of that feudal order as the modern state slowly emerged from the com-
petition between the claims of the regional nobility and national mon-
archy, the increasing centralization of state power, with its
accompanying centralization of justice, and the rise of mercantilism
and the growth of the legal rights of the bourgeoisie as against both the
nobility and the monarchy. These and other common social features
served to limit the degree to which common law and civil law could in
fact diverge.
The development of law in the West from the Middle Ages to the
Renaissance was characterized both in England and on the Continent
35. Id at 244-45.
36. Id
37. Id at 289.
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by the emergence of centralized, nationally administered legal systems.
These systems resulted from competition between royal law and other
local and topical laws and the institutions which existed for their en-
forcement. A gradual and uneven centralization of justice accompa-
nies the halting emergence of the modem state. Hence, the royal
courts, whose role in the history of common law is often emphasized,
were also extremely important in the history of law on the Continent?"
The intellectual traditions of the practicing lawyer in England and the
university doctor on the Continent overlapped to a certain extent, espe-
cially in their common references to Roman law. Professor Yntema
wrote that
[as] the result of a silent acceptance of ideas, more penetrating than a
formal reception could be, the basic ideas as to legal system and ter-
minology and the common legal conceptions, particularly of the law
of property and commercial relations, only less obviously in English
and American law than in the continental European systems, lead
back to Rome.39
The great systematizers of common law, beginning with Glanvil and
Bracton, were greatly influenced by Roman law.40 Blackstone, for ex-
ample, used it extensively.4 1
E. Equity
Even the development of English equity cannot unequivocally be
counted as a feature distinguishing the histories of common and civil
law. The rules of equity were drawn in large part from Roman and
canon law.42 The triumph of equity assured this body of Romanisti-
cally influenced thought an important place in English law. At the
heart of equity was a strictly medieval conception of the relation of the
imperfection of human law to the perfection of the laws of God and of
38. Professor Strayer's discussion of the gradual strengthening of the royal courts of
France under Philip IV (1285-1314) is instructive. See generally . STRAYER, THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE FAIR (1980); see also J. STRAYER, LEs GENS DE JUSTICE DU LANGUEDOC SOUS
PHILIPPE LE BEL (1970).
39. Yntema, Roman Law as the Basis of Comparative Law, in 2 LAw-A CENTURY OF
PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 346, 349 (1937).
40. PLUCKNETT, supra note 25, at 297.
41. Blackstone's thought was generally characteristic of legal thought in the Enlighten-
ment. See Himmelfarb, Bentham Versus Blackstone, 47 AM. SCHOLAR 537 (1978). Black-
stone attributed his account of the general nature of laws to Romanistic sources. 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *38-62. He sometimes even peo-
pled his hypotheticals with Gaius and Titius, characters out of Justinian. See, ag., a:a at *56.
42. DAVID, supra note 1, at 332-34.
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nature or reason.43 This conception was not unique to English thought.
One hundred fifty years after James I secured the position of equity in
the English legal system, Blackstone quoted Grotius and gave equity
a broad definition. This definition descended from the medieval con-
ception of equity and was not distinguishable from what aequilas
meant to a continental lawyer of Blackstone's day. Since the legislator
cannot provide in advance for unforeseeable cases, Blackstone wrote,
equity exists to assure that when the laws come to be applied, they will
not be applied in those circumstances which, had they been foreseen,
the legislator himself would have excepted. "And these are the cases,
which as Grotius expresses it, "lex non exacte dfni, sed arbitrio boni
viri permittit. 3 ,145
F. Effects of the Enlightenment
Since the eighteenth century, common law and civil law have in-
creasingly converged. The spirit of the Enlightenment affected all
fields of thought and joined French and English thinkers in a common
stream of political and social speculation. It also crossed the Atlantic
and deeply affected the law and politics of the United States. Albert
Guerard captured its internationalism well in this passage:
It has been said that Voltaire was "England's best gift to France."
This might be extended to the whole Enlightenment. Montesquieu
studied and expounded the English constitution. Voltaire's sojourn
in London revealed him to himself; his first decisive contribution to
liberal thought was his Lettres philosophiques, or Letires anglaises.
Diderot knew English well; the starting point of his Encyclopedia was
Chambers' Dictionary. Buffon's favorite authors were Milton and
Richardson. The masters of French thought then were Bacon,
Locke, Newton, and secondarily, the "Deists," Toland, Collins,
Woolston, Tindal, Shaftesbury. It must be said that the England
they admired had never been so Frenchified: it was the age of Addi-
son and Pope, of whom Boileau himself would have approved. Cul-
turally the eighteenth century was an Anglo-French condominium,
and under that sign America was born. Jefferson was such a typical
American because he was so true to the spirits of both England and
France. Englishmen were later to revel in "the wisdom of
43. 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 29, at 279.
44. Arguments Proving from Antiquity the Dignity, Power, and Jurisdiction of the
Court of Chancery, I Chan. Rep. (App.) 1, 21 Eng. Rep. 576 (1616).
45. 1 W. BLAcKsToNTE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *61 (quoting Gro-
tius, De.Aequitate. The Latin refers to cases which "the law imperfectly limits, but should,
in the judgment of a good man, permit").
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prejudice." But when they take pride in their freedom from clear
thinking, we cannot forget that they were the initiators and masters
of the Enlightenment 46
The two strands of thought which had the greatest effect on law during
this period were political theories regarding natural rights and classic
economic liberalism,47 both of which agreed that minimum interfer-
ence with individual freedom was the single greatest object of legal sys-
tems." Because the growing rights of the commercial classes threatened
the old order, the late eighteenth century was a turbulent time in law
and politics, an "age of democratic revolution" affecting the entire
West 4 9 Out of the legal and political struggles of the time emerged our
modem Western law in a form that still exists today.
The natural-law school began to develop a European public law
based on English models.5" Its traditional major branches, criminal
law, administrative law, and constitutional law, still organize the sub-
ject today in common-law5 and civil-law5" countries alike. The idea
that government itself should be governed and that state action should
adhere to legal standards is at the heart of modern public law, espe-
cially constitutional and administrative law. In all the Western legal
systems and in others touched by them, there is a discernible trend to-
ward enshrining the most important principles of public law in rigid
constitutions protected by judicial review. Presently there are still
many variants of constitutionalism, but they do not break down along
common-law/civil-law lines, and as Professor Cappelletti has pointed
out, they are all variations on a basic motif in our shared Western his-
tory.53 If the welfare state continues to grow and individual autonomy
correspondingly continues to contract, then constitutionalism may well
play an increasingly important role in staking out an area of individual
46. A. GUERARD, FRANc: A MODEMR HISTORY 208-09 (rev. ed. Gagnon 1969).
47. John Herman Randall, Jr., told the story of the period well in Chapter XIII, "'The
Science of Man-The Sciences of Human Nature and of Business," in J. RANDALL, THE
MAKING OF THE MODEMN MIND (1927).
48. Sawer, The Western Conception of Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 14, 43 (R. David ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Sawer].
49. R. PALMER, THE AGE OF DEmOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLrTCAL HisrOpY OF
EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-1800; 1 THE CHALLENGE (1959); 2 THE STRUGOLE (1964).
50. DAvD, supra note I, at 47.
51. Ogus, Economics, Liberty, and the Common Law, 15 J. Soc'Y PuB. TcHus. L 42
(1980).
52. Szladits The CivilLawSystem, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARA-
TnvE LAW 14,50-51 (R. David ed. 1974); A. WEILL & F. TERRA, DRorr CivWL: INTRODUC-
TION GbrRALE 156 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WEILL & TERR.
53. M. CAPPELLETTi, supra note 5, at 97.
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choice against the collective massing of power in government. In any
case, modem law is dominated in common-law and civil-law countries
by the growth of public law and its increasing impingement upon the
field of private law. 4 The greater problems of administering law in the
modem Western welfare state, such as the problem of controlling ad-
ministrative discretion so as to avoid abuse, 55 confront both common-
law and civil-law nations. The solutions which they have adopted to
solve these problems also seem not to divide along a common-
law/civil-law line, 56 hence it is probably more accurate to speak of a
Western public law family, rather than a common-law or civil-law fam-
ily in public law. The creation of the welfare state has largely been
accomplished by legislative reform5 7 making the statute the preemi-
nent form of law in the twentieth century, in common-law countries as
much as in civil-law countries.
The legal thought of the Enlightenment produced a new ideal of
legal order appropriate to the new Europe-a Europe composed of
newly emergent imperial states whose economies would be increasingly
based on private trade and industry. The legal ideal which emerged
comprised a public law rationalizing and limiting the new national sov-
ereign and a private law modeled on freely bargained economic inter-
action. Both were united under a fundamental social charter
guaranteeing popular government and private autonomy. The twenti-
eth century has seen the gradual erosion of that ideal and its partial
replacement by a new public administrative order in European and
Anglo-American legal systems alike.
The European Enlightenment also gave birth to the movement for
codification which, with the French Code civil (Civil Code) in 1804,
marks a watershed in the history of the civil-law family. There were
other early codes, 58 but the enormous prestige and success of the Code
Napol'on (Napoleonic Code) assured the codification movement a fu-
ture. This assurance in turn served to divide the civil law and the com-
mon law systems along a new axis, that of codified and uncodified legal
54. DAVID, supra note I, at 67-70, 338-39, 410-12. See also Jones, The Brooding Outi-
presence of Constitutional Law, 4 VT. L. REv. 1 (1979).
55. See general K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (1976),
56. Id
57. DAVID, supra note 1, at 339, 411. Naturally there have been important bodies of
developing decisional law in the field of public law, such as United States constitutional law
and French administrative law (developed by and large by the Conseil d'etat), but these two
exist in common-law and civil-law countries alike.
58. The Prussian Al1gemeines Landrecht of 1794 and the Austrian Civil Code of 1811
are noteworthy.
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systems. Although from time to time prominent English jurists-Ben-
tham, Austin, Pollock, Maitland, and others59 -favored codification,
the movement never took root in England. The United States flirted
more seriously with codes during the nineteenth century,6° and a few
areas of law, such as civil procedure, were systematically codified. Cal-
ifornia actually enacted a complete system of codes, and there is rela-
tively little California statutory law that is not contained in them. The
table of contents of the California Civil Code reveals that its structure
has been greatly influenced by the structure of the continental civil
codes of the early nineteenth century. California lawyers, however,
have not abandoned common-law ways of reasoning or common-law
attitudes toward legal authorities. 6' Even so, the major divisions of the
typical European civil code-the law of persons, family, property, suc-
cession, contracts, delicts, and quasi-contract (the last three generally
grouped together by civilians as the law of obligations)-are almost all
recognizable divisions of common law, and most common-law lawyers
would agree that they form the bulk of our private law. In common-
law countries there has been a trend toward selective codification. 62
Civil-law countries have gradually seen the transformation of their
laws into a much more heterogeneous, less completely codified collec-
tion of codes (some of which are not codes in the true sense, but mere
compilations), ordinary statutes, decisional law, and administrative
regulations.63 The reconciliation between the codified civil-law tradi-
tion and the decisional common-law tradition has not eliminated the
animating ideologies of each but has brought them close in practice.
The battery of legal authorities to which a common lawyer will refer
today looks quite like the law library of the civil lawyer.
G. The Nineteenth Century
The nineteenth century saw a movement for rationalization and
systematization of the law which also brought common law and civil
59. See Hahlo, Here Lies the Common Law: Rest in Peace, 30 MoD. L REv. 241, 242
n.14 (1967).
60. See M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at
59-90 (1976).
61. Merryman's The CivilLaw Tradition contains an excellent discussion of the civilian
ideology of codification and contrasts it intelligently with prevalent common law attitudes
toward codes; MERRYMAN, supra note 21, at 27-34. See also ZWOGERT & K6Tz, supra note
2, at 270.
62. For a general survey, see Donald, Codification in Common Law Systems, 47 Ausm.
LJ. 160 (1973).
63. See Tallon, Reforming the Codes in a CivilLaw Country, 15 J. Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. L
33 (1980).
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law closer in some respects. Legal science, which most strongly influ-
enced the Germanic members of the Continental legal tradition, had
important effects upon the law of the United States as well, especially
in the traditional fields of tort and contract. 64 At about the same time
that legal science was making its appearance, law and equity were
merged in England and the United States. 65 Although equity has re-
ceded into the historical background, the distinction between law and
equity remains. For example, the trust, equity's most successful off-
spring, is a vital institution in United States and English law, and in
important respects its rules do show their equitable ancestry. Few if
any law students in the United States, however, are systematically ex-
posed to equity as a subject. The prevailing attitude of most contempo-
rary law students and lawyers seems to be that equity is now a
historical curiosity. There are many areas of contemporary law in
which equity has left its traces, but they have been so seamlessly assim-
ilated that few lawyers are aware of the influence of equity.
H. Summary
Even today there are reasons to preserve the distinction between
common-law and civil-law families. By no means have they been
fused. Their histories, however, have always drawn from a common
fund of Western ideas66 and have increasingly converged. Their histo-
ries, although distinctive, have been but two currents in the mainstream
of Western history, and were they to be compared to the histories of
Soviet law, Indian Asian law, Far Eastern Asian law, African law, or
Islamic law, the differences would be like night and day. One must
conclude, therefore, that historically the common-law and civil-law le-
gal traditions are two distinct but related members of a larger Western
liberal democratic legal tradition.
64. For the representative views of Dean Langdell, author of the first United States
casebook (on contracts), see G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 12 (1974). For a dis-
cussion of the impact of legal science on the law of torts, see White, The Impact a/Legal
Science on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 COL. L. REV. 213 (1978). See also MERRYMAN, Stpra
note 21, at 65-72. Professor Merryman seems to underestimate the continuing importance of
legal science in United States legal thought.
65. DAVID, supra note 1, at 338, 411.
66. See 1 P. ARMINJON, B. NOLDE & M. WOLFF, TRAITft DE DROIT COMPAR9 55-91
(1950). Not only have there been several common stocks of legal ideas in the West, such as
Roman Law, Canon Law, and Commercial Law, id, there has also been, through cross-
fertilization, a sharing of technical doctrines and rules. See infra text accompanying notes
114-50.
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IV. CONCEPTION OF LAW
Although one might attempt to isolate, analyze, and compare an
Anglo-American and a continental conception of law and its place in
the social order, almost everyone who has used conception of law as a
subject of comparative study has concluded that there is one Western
conception of law shared in common-law and civil-law countries
alike.67 There are, however, certain Western assumptions about law
and its place in society which do divide along a common-law/civil-law
cleavage, such as common-law assumptions about judicial authority
and civil-law assumptions about legislation and codification. These as-
sumptions, however, are more in the nature of the professional legal
traditions of common law and civil law68 and are to be distinguished
from the shared conception of law described here. As stated earlier,
69
conception of law means a society's set of ruling assumptions about law
and the role of law in organizing social life. Society's general assump-
tions are to be distinguished from the traditional assumptions held by
the society's legal professionals, for their professional specialization fre-
quently gives these persons a special conception of law with assump-
tions regarding law often not shared by other members of society. A
legal system's professional legal tradition exerts an enormous influence
upon its law,7" but this influence is generally within the framework of
the larger social conception of law." This section concerns those as-
sumptions of Western legal thought which are common to and widely
accepted by entire Western societies.
67. See, ag., BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at 35-49; DAVID, supra note 1, at 461-62; R.
DAVID, TRAIT ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARE 222-24 (1950); ZWEIGERT &
KbTz, supra note 2, at 66-67. Zweigert and Kdtz use the term "ideology," but the context
makes it clear that conception of law, as the term is used here, is what is intended. Deux
Conceptions, supra note 2; Sawer, supra note 48. See also P. STEIN & J. SHAND, LEGAL
VALUES IN WESTERN SOcIETY (1974) [hereinafter cited as STEIN & SlAND]. Professor
David thinks that not only has there existed a common Western conception regarding law's
place in the social order, but that the consciousness of certain shared Western values ("une
conscience plus nette des affinit6s qui existent entre les pays europ6ens attaches a certaines
valeurs de la civilisation occidentale") is one of the factors responsible for the recent conver-
gence of common-law and civil-law legal systems which so many comparatists have noted.
DAVID, supra note 1, at 339.
68. For the best description of the civil-law tradition, see generally MERRYMAN, supra
note 21.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
70. See generally MERRYMAN, supra note 21. For perhaps the most thoughtful and the
most famous discussion, see MAX WEBER ON LAW IN EcoNOMY AND SocIETY 198-223 (ch.
VII, "The Legal Honoratiores and the Types of Legal Thought") (Rheinstein ed. 1954).
71. For discussion of professional legal tradition, see infra text accompanying notes
206-07.
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Many conceptions of law have competed for acceptance in the
course of Western history. One of the hallmarks of Western intellec-
tual history is the enormous body of speculative thought which it has
produced regarding law and society,72 probably as a function of the
primacy of law in Western social order.73 The resulting modern West-
ern conception of law reflects the richness and complexity of its history
and encompasses a remarkable variety of fundamental legal values not
always consistent with one another or with actual practices of law in
the West today. The present analysis of the Western conception of law
focuses on the common fundamental assumptions regarding law in
four general categories: the place of law in the social order, the form
law takes, its application, and its substance.74
A. Place of Law in the Social Order
Perhaps the single most important feature of Western legal
thought is the primary place accorded to law in the social order. In
Western societies, social control has been exercised by law, and social
order has in turn been reflected by law to an extent not found elsewhere
in the world.75 No other system of beliefs or institutions in Western
societies exerts a degree of social influence equal to that of law. In
every Western nation, an enormous variety of social controversies is
submitted to judges for resolution based upon established legal princi-
72. Sawer, supra note 48, at 47. Professor Bozeman has stated:
No word in the political vocabulary of the West has exercised the imagination
as consistently as "law." From the times of classical Greece to the middle of the
twentieth century, men in this civilization have tried not only to catch in a durable
definition the essence of what has been generally known as law, but also to dis-
cover its sources and to delineate its functions. They have speculated ceaselessly
about the relations between law and nature, law and reason, law and tradition, law
and religion, law and justice, law and power, and law and society, and have been
profusely inventive in creating a great variety of actual legal processes and
institutions.
BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at 35-36.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 75-84.
74. For a historical review of the Western conception of law, see Sawer, supra note 48,
For a discussion of the Western legal values of order, justice, and personal freedom, see
STEIN & SHAND, supra note 67.
75. In the Islamic world, the Shari'a (Islamic law) also plays an important role, but it is
quite unlike Western law in other respects.
The Shari'a is the path laid down by the Creator; in following it men will find both
moral and material well-being. The Shari'a regulates in great detail the dealings of
individuals with each other and with the community; it encompasses all man's du-
ties to God and his fellow-man.
Afchar, The Muslim Conception ofLaw, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARA-
TIVE LAW 84, 86 (R. David ed. 1975).
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ples of general application. Professor David, who calls the occidental
nations "countries of law," points out that the West continues to be-
lieve that social order must be founded essentially on law,76 a belief
with which other cultures have disagreed.77 Law has not only been a
paramount reference in Western society, but it has also been a popular
and respected one. As Professor Geoffrey Sawer remarked, "A respect
for and even a demand for the legal approach to the structuring or
ordering of social relations has kept triumphing over the periodic dis-
satisfaction with the particular structure or order achieved at a particu-
lar time and place."
78
Both in the Far East and in Africa, processes of conciliation and
mediation often displace legal institutions of dispute resolution, and
those legal institutions which do exist are often regarded suspiciously.7 9
While law has been the primary source of social cohesion in the West,
social order in Asia and Africa has traditionally been dominated and
effectively maintained by such forces as "respect for religion, etiquette,
the stabilizing function of war and conflict, or the superior wisdom reg-
ularly imputed to selected men."8 0 The socialist conception of law,
which is like our Western conception in so many other respects, follows
Marx's thought in looking toward the gradual withering away of law as
a last vestige of bourgeois society."'
An interesting aspect of the Western conception of social order is
that while only the state makes law, the state is a creature of that law
and is structured in accordance with a higher law limiting its power.
Other cultures have not always associated law with the political organi-
zation of the state. In Islamic thought, for example, there is an uneasy
tension between the Sharla (Islamic law), which is respected and re-
vered, and government, which has tended to be feared and distrusted
76. "Pays de Droit." Deux Conceptions, supra note 2, at 55, 62. Professor Geoffrey
Sawer finds the characterization vague. Sawer, supra note 48, at 46. If, however, one takes
"law" to mean approximately what it does in the West, one will readily concede that most
cultures today have had some experience with law in that Western sense, and many reject it
as a social reference. The author believes this is what Professor David intended, and it is a
point worth making.
77. See, ag., BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at xiii.
78. Sawer, supra note 48, at 48.
79. See Noda, The Far Eastern Conception of Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 120, 128-29, 133 (R. David ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Noda];
A~lott,A4rbitral Proceedings in Customary Law, in EsSAYS IN AFRICAN L w 117, 149 (1960).
80. BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at xi.
81. For more and less utopian positions on the withering away of state and law, com-
pare Pashukanis' The General Theory of Law and Marxin with his later State and Law
Under Socialism in PASHUKANIS: SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAw 37, 346
(Beirne & Sharlet eds. 1980).
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but tolerated as a necessary evil.82 In African societies, the state has
developed fairly recently, and law is most closely associated with kin
and tribe.83 Both traditional Russian and Chinese societies had
equivalents of modem state-administered legal systems, but neither
conceived of the state itself as being a creature of law.
84
Law in the West has also achieved a high degree of autonomy and
professional specialization and has gradually absorbed the values of
nonlegal social institutions, thereby displacing them. Most of the im-
portant functions in Western legal systems are carried out by persons
who are professionally trained and who devote their working lives to
the law. There is even specialization within the law, for example, be-
tween judges and lawyers. 85 As a result of this specialization, Western
law has acquired a fair amount of doctrinal autonomy. Its doctrines
have been extensively and directly influenced by the theorizing of its
own professional specialists, thus acquiring a certain independence
from other social influences. 6 This independence, however, has also
been partially secured by borrowing values from outside the legal sys-
tem, making the law representative of community moral sentiment.
Western ideals of contract, for example, have absorbed and reflected
confidence in the future and in the promises of others, thus illustrating
this "systematic, deliberate way in which legally crucial norms have
been borrowed from ethics, philosophy, or religion, to be carefully
transposed into reliable maxims of law."817 Moreover, "law has been
consistently trusted in the West as the main carrier of shared values, the
most effective agent of social control, and the only reliable principle
capable of moderating and reducing the reign of passion, arbitrariness,
and caprice in human life."' 8
B. Form of Law
Another fundamental set of commonly held assumptions about the
nature of law relates to its form. Perhaps the most important of these
assumptions is the belief that law should be written. Our Western legal
tradition has been a literate tradition, although other legal traditions
82. See BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at 58-75, 91-98.
83. Id at 91-98.
84. See H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW
187-225 (rev. ed. 1963); Noda, supra note 79, at 126.
85. Sawer, supra note 48, at 46.
86. Id
87. BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at 37-38.
88. Id at 38.
[Vol. 6
Common Law and Civil Law
have not. Traditional African customary law, for example, was oral.8 9
Writing has made possible a number of the characteristics of Western
law: the development of law beyond the capacity of memory; the care-
ful analysis, criticism, and reconstruction of legal principles; and the
conscious evolution of law as a complex system of abstract normsf 0
Literacy gives Westerners a distinctive relation to language and hence a
different relation to law. When thought cannot be memorialized in
writing, communication demands the immediate presence of others.
As a result, language develops as an instrument more of action than
reflection and becomes especially dependent upon the needs of the mo-
ment and the particulars of each personal encounter.9' Oral communi-
ties are thus not as well equipped for the impersonal normative
generality of Western legal thought.
The Western conception of legal literacy also distinguishes the
West from other literate societies with developed legal systems. Most
comparisons of Western and non-Western legal thought have noted the
high degree of abstraction, formalization, and conceptual complexity
exhibited in Western law.92 The roots of Western legal formalism
spring from classical Roman law, noted for its high "degree of distinct-
ness, normative and procedural vigour and sophistication, and concep-
tual richness.1 93 Those roots are deep enough that even though
twentieth-century legal realism has thoroughly discredited nineteenth-
century mechanical jurisprudence, most Westerners still assume that
the law should be a highly systematic and rather logical system of rules.
This assumption, however, is not shared by all legal systems.94 In fact,
some legal systems have regarded law as primarily comprising
processes of dispute resolution unregulated by any system of rules,95
89. M'Baye, The African Conception of Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, 149-50 (R. David ed. 1975).
90. None of these characteristics exist in the African customary legal tradition. Allott,
The Unity of African Law, in ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAw 55, 62 (1960).
91. Professor Bozeman's book, The Future of Law in a Aulticultural IWorld, contains a
most thoughtful discussion of the effects of orality on African conceptions of law and poli-
tics. BozEMAN, supra note 12, at 9 1-111.
92. See, e-g., BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at 36; Sawer, supra note 48, at 46.
93. Sawer, supra note 48, at 17-18.
94. Compare, for example, the traditional Japanese distaste for submitting disputes to
rigorous logical analysis. The Japanese feel this process degrades human relations. Kim &
Lawson, supra note 13, at 502.
95. See BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at 148, regarding the Chinese conception. See gener-
ali David, Introduction, 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw 3 (R.
David ed. 1975).
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unlike the Western idea of law as a system of rules of behavior and
institutions to assure compliance.
Western law is also regarded as secular, despite the importance of
canon law in Western legal history. Only the socialist legal systems
also adopt this conception. In the Indian,96 Islamic, 97 Far Eastern, 98
and African99 conceptions, law is inextricably tied to the larger scheme
of life, earthly and divine. None of these legal orders recognizes a dis-
tinction between law and religion.
C. Application of Law
Certain elements of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century concepts
of natural law concerning the application of law have spread to all the
major nonsocialist Western legal systems and are now an established
part of the Western conception of law. Among these elements is the
.impersonal generality of law, that is, the notion that all persons, regard-
less of ethnic background, social class, religious belief, or political
viewpoint should stand in a position of formal equality before the
law. 10 The application of law in other legal traditions, such as the
Chinese and the Indian, has been explicitly status-determined. 0,' Law
96. See generally R. LINGAT, THE CLASSICAL LAW OF INDIA (J.D.M. Dcrrett trans,
1973); J. DERRETT, RELIGION, LAW AND THE STATE IN INDIA (1968).
97. Islamic law (known in some parts of the world as "Muhammadan law") is a
body of rules which gives practical expression to the religious faith and aspiration
of the Muslim. Total and unqualified submission to the will of Allah is the funda-
mental tenet of Islam, and the law which is associated with the religion defines the
will of Allah in terms of a comprehensive code of behaviour covering all aspects of
life. All aspects of life: for ritual practices, such as prayer, fasting, alms, and pil-
grimage, the subjects of permissible food and styles of dress, and social etiquette
generally are as vital and integral a part of the system as those topics which are
strictly legal in the Western sense of the term. Known as the "Shari'a," a deriva-
tive of an Arabic root word meaning "track" or "road," this law constitutes a di-
vinely ordained path of conduct which guides the Muslim toward fulfillment of his
religious conviction in this life and reward from his Creator in the world to come.
Coulson, Islamic Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEMS 54 (J. Derrett ed. 1968),
See also supra note 75.
98. See Noda, supra note 79.
99. See BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at 98-99; Allott, supra note 90, at 55, 69.
100. Sawer, supra note 48, at 39. See MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
145 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954) for Weber's interesting explanation of "[t]he ever-increasing
integration of all individuals and all fact-situations into one compulsory institution which
today, at least, rests in principle on formal 'legal equality.'" Id
101. Fa, the ancient system of Chinese criminal sanctions, was related to social standing.
Affront to status, rather than any conception of individual moral wrongdoing, triggered pun-
ishment. Hence, punishment varied according to one's social rank. Similarly, dharma, the
ancient yet still highly influential Indian concept approximating our concept of legal duty,
was defined by one's caste. BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at 124, 144-46.
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in the modem Western conception is also expected to be applied im-
partially, 0 2 an assumption closely related to the expectation that it is to
be applied generally and impersonally. Perhaps these assumptions
may best be summarized in the following comparison: the application
of law in the Far East, in Africa, and in Islamic societies appeals to a
sense of the individuars place in the cosmic order; the application of
law in the socialist world appeals to class power programmatically ap-
plied; and the application of law in the common-law and civil-law
worlds appeals to eighteenth-century rationality.
Fuller's The Morality of Law 10 3 is a thoughtful description of the
contribution that eighteenth-century natural lawyers made to the mod-
em Western conception of the form of law and its application. Al-
though The Morality of Law was part of a debate in analytic
jurisprudence, Fuller himself acknowledged its relation to the natural-
law thought of the Enlightenment. °0 Most jurists in the West regard
Fuller's eight principles of "the internal morality of law" as self-evident
and requiring little justification,'05 a sign that they are among the cus-
tomary assumptions which constitute the Western conception of law.
First, the law must achieve a certain generality if its standards are to be
considered rules and if cases are not simply to be decided ad hoc. Sec-
ond, when the law is promulgated it must be made public so that all
who are affected by it may govern their conduct accordingly. Third,
the law should apply prospectively, since retroactive legislation cannot
serve as a guide to action and undercuts the integrity of prospective
legislation. Fourth, the law must be clearly written. Fifth, the law
must be internally consistent. Sixth, laws should not require the impos-
sible, that is, conduct beyond the powers of the persons to be governed.
Seventh, the law should not change so frequently that persons affected
are unable to regulate their behavior accordingly. Finally, official ac-
tion must be in accord with officially declared rules, for if government
does not obey its own laws, government itself is to some extent
lawless. 106
D. The Substance of the Law
The natural-law tradition has not only influenced the Western
conception of the form law should take and the manner in which it
102. STEIN & SHAND, supra note 67, at 74.
103. L. FULLER, THE MORALrIY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as FULLER].
104. Id at 96-97.
105. Id at 98.
106. Id at 39, 46-81.
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should be applied, but it has also affected the Western conception of
the law's substance. Some of the elements of the Western conception of
natural justice may be traced to Aristotle,10 7 but the primary Western
assumptions of substantive justice were given their modern form in the
seventeenth and-eighteenth centuries and center around two cardinal
values: individualism and liberty. 108 Until well into the nineteenth
century, "philosophical as well as the sociological influences favoredminimum interference with the individual's freedom of action as the
principal value to be sought by legal systems."' 10 9 There remains today
in Western legal systems a basic disposition in favor of freedom to bar-
gain and to make contracts, and to acquire, use, and dispose of
property.
Western law favors individualism over communalism. It encour-
ages individual innovation and daring, rather than individual subordi-
nation to a preordained social role. By contrast, in virtually all other
major legal orders, individualism is felt to be a disruptive force.' ° In
the modern Western conception, law is felt to exist largely to encourage
individual expression and economic initiative. An expansive concep-
tion of individual autonomy is probably responsible for the central im-
portance of the person and legal personality in all Western legal
systems. Of course, individual responsibility must balance individual
freedom. Thus, in Western legal thought, right and duty are viewed as
necessary correlatives and are equally enshrined in the concept of legal
personality. The person is legally empowered to assume and exercise
rights and to discharge obligations."' These fundamental assumptions
107. See STEIN & SHAND, supra note 67, at 59-63. See also J. STONE, HUMAN LAW AND
HUMAN JUSTICE 13-14, 46-55 (1965).
108. Since the seventeenth century ... the problem of personal freedom has been
expressed in terms of certain natural rights, which every society ought to guarantee
to all its members. The theory of natural rights became associated with the mod-
em individualist notion of an area circumscribed around the individual, in which
he could exercise his own will. Neither the government nor the legislature was to
encroach or allow encroachment on this area. The traditional natural rights, as
asserted in the eighteenth-century Declarations, are freedom of the person, of
property, of speech, and of association. They indicate the areas within which the
individual may do as he wishes, because to deny him freedom of choice in respect
of them is tantamount to denial of his human personality.
STEIN & SHAND, supra note 67, at 150.
109. Sawer, supra note 48, at 43.
110. For a comparative discussion of the central role of individualism in Western legal
thought, as well as its relatively reduced role in the legal thought of traditional Indian, Is-
lamic, Chinese, and African societies, see BOZEMAN, supra note 12. For a comparison of the
reduced role of individualism in socialist legal thought, see H. BERMAN, stora note 84, at 97-
100, 152-67.
Ill. See generally STEIN & SHAND, supra note 67, at 114-41.
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about human nature and the individual's place in the social order come
together most clearly in the institution of contract and may explain why
contract became a preeminent Western legal institution.'
1 2
Even so, one wonders whether the traditional liberal conception of
law is not giving way to a new conception in the West, or at least re-
treating from the intense individualism of nineteenth-century Western
legal thought. With the rise of the administrative welfare state since
the middle of the nineteenth century, there has arisen a broader senti-
ment of social justice which would guarantee the basic necessities of
life and certain other material opportunities to all persons regardless of
their ability to obtain them by contract." 3 Many regard this guarantee
as a natural right or legal entitlement and not as a form of institutional-
ized charity. It is difficult to assess the depth and popularity of this
shift in the Western sense of substantive justice. No common-law or
civil-law nation has attributed as much conceptual importance to the
assurance of fundamental economic and social rights as have the so-
cialist countries, for whom these rights are important ideological build-
ing blocks in the construction of a new economic and social order, but
even the Western liberal democracies now seem founded partly on a
conception of state-provided social welfare.
V. STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF THE POSITIVE LAW
Scholars repeatedly observe that the individual rules of Western
112. BOZEMAN, supra note 12, at 36-42. The classical Roman contract law became first
the frame of reference for all the many medieval associations of partnership, guild, and
corporation. It then became the frame of reference for chartered political organizations
from Italian republican city-states to modem nations and international organizations-all
unions on a contractual basis. It may be that the Western conception of an impersonal,
secular, precisely defined, liberal law encourages social relationships largely of a contractual
type. Members of a contractual relationship seek a relatively precise definition of their re-
spective rights and duties, but want the liberty to choose freely whether to contract.
Whether this helps explain why the Western conception of law could have arisen only in
Western civilization, it is nonetheless true that neither in modem socialist legal systems nor
in more traditional legal orders (Chinese, Indian, Islamic, African) do we find this conjunc-
tion of legal values favoring individual expression and economic initiative. -See STEIN &
SHAND, supra note 67, at 18-20, 23-24.
113. STEIN & SHAND, supra note 67, at 67-68.
A society which approximated to Rawls' ideal [as set forth in J. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTiCE (197 1)] would turn out to be a constitutional democracy which guaran-
teed equal basic liberties to every citizen, which assured every citizen a minimum
social and economic position, and which thereafter encouraged equality of oppor-
tunity. . . . [Rawls'] theory is, in our opinion, the most satisfactory explanation of
the value of justice in Western society that has yet been offered.
Id at 73.
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legal systems on particular legal subjects show a high degree of conver-
gence and that the doctrinal differences which exist do not divide along
common-law/civil-law lines." 4 This observation suggests that com-
mon-law and civil-law systems formally belong to a single Western le-
gal tradition. A comparison of their deeper structural elements
supports this position.
A. Major Categories
1. Public Law and Private Law
In examining the fundamental categories or major divisions of
common law and civil law, consideration must first be given to the pub-
lic-law/private-law dichotomy. Many comparatists have found this di-
chotomy to typify civil-law thought and to be largely foreign to that of
common law." 5 Most civil-law countries divide their national law into
these two major categories,' 1 6 but common-law attorneys also recog-
nize and utilize these same categories. 17 The distinction in fact seems
to be of diminishing importance in civil law." 8 Professors Alex Weill
and Francois Terr6 conclude their discussion of the many recent criti-
cisms of the dichotomy with three observations: first, government is
still largely regulated by a set of rules different from those which regu-
late the relations of the private person; second, the importance of tradi-
tional private law is diminishing as public law expands and the state
intervenes in traditional fields of private relations; and, third, in at-
tempting to preserve a certain measure of private initiative in public
enterprises, the state itself increasingly borrows from private-law mod-
els in its forms of administrative intervention." 9 These observations
apply with similar force to the relations of public law and private law
in common-law countries today.
120
Also, the major subdivisions of public law-constitutional law, ad-
ministrative law, criminal law-are similar in common-law and civil-
114. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
115. See, e.g., DAVID, supra note I, at 79-81; MERRYMAN, supra note 21, at 99-102,
116. See, e.g., WEILL & TERRt, supra note 52, at 56.
117. See, e.g., G. PATON & D. DERHAM, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 326-30 (4th
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as PATON & DERHAM]; see generally Ogus, supra note 5 1.
118. See Szladits, The Civil Law Systems, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COM-
PARATIvE LAW 48 (R. David ed. 1974).
119. WEILL & TERR-, supra note 52, at 72-75.
120. Several articles on "Le Ph~nomne Universel de la Publicization du Droit Priv6,"
the universal phenomenon of the publicization of private law, can be found in 3 INTRODUC-
TION A L'ETUDE DU DROIT COMPARE: RECUEIL D'ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR D'EDOUARD
LAMBERT §§ 143-147 (1938 reprinted 1973).
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law countries.' 2 ' While administrative law in England is not the same
as droit administratif (administrative law) in France, 12 this point could
also be made with equal force regarding English and United States ad-
ministrative law."2
Since the importance of the distinction between public law and
private law in civil-law systems has diminished somewhat, and since
the functional utility of the distinction is largely the same in common-
law and civil-law legal systems, the distinction can no longer be said to
clearly divide Western legal systems. The distinction will perhaps con-
tinue to enjoy a more important place in civil-law thought than it does
in common-law thought, but the two groups are largely convergent.
2. Federal and Nonfederal Organization
In both common-law and civil-law families, there are some legal
systems which are federally organized and others which are not. The
distinction between state and federal law is, for example, of fundamen-
tal importance in United States law but nonexistent in English law.'
24
Similarly there are both federal and nonfederal states within the civil-
law family. The comparison of Western and Soviet federalism is be-
yond the scope of this paper, but the Soviets have traditionally viewed
their federalism as unique. 25 Such a comparison might reveal that
with respect to one more fundamental category, the division between
federal and state law, it makes sense to speak of a Western family of
legal systems.'
26
121. See PATON & DERHAM, supra note 117, at 329; WEILL & TERRiSUpra note 52, at
69-70.
122. DAVID, supra note 1, at 342.
123. A comparative survey of administrative law in common-law and civil-law countries
would probably disclose common patterns of administrative regulation with large variations,
but with no clear breakdown in pattern and variation along a common-law/civil-law axis.
This observation is certainly true with respect to Western constitutional law. See generally
M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 5. If one compares the constitutional values of common-law
and civil-law systems with those of the socialist legal systems, there appears good reason to
speak of a Western public law, rather than a common-law or civil-law public law. STEIN &
SHAND, supra note 67, at 142-63. See supra text accompanying notes 50-57.
124. Professor David recognizes this fact and discusses United States federalism exten-
sively. DAVID, supra note 1, at 415-28.
125. See generally J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSMt:
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND HISTORICAL COMMENTARY 35-46 (3d ed. 1977).
126. Federalism as an idea was born in the Enlightenment and is closely, although per-
haps not inseparably, connected to Western constitutionalism. See Friedrich, Federal Con-
stitutional Theory and Emergent Proposals, in FEDERALISM: MATURE AND FMERGENT 510
(A. Macmahon ed. 1962). Professor McWhinney, one of the foremost writers on compara-
tive federalism, speaks of Western federalism as the "classical" form of constitutional feder-
alism. See E. MCWHINNEY, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: STATES' RIGHTS AND NATIONAL
1982]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
3. Civil Law and Commercial Law
The study of private law has dominated Western comparative
law. 127 While there is some agreement upon basic divisions, there are
important differences. The primary difference is the concept of civil
law as a fundamental unit. The frequent use of the term "civil law," or
ius civile, from Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis to the civil codes of the
last two centuries has deeply embedded in continental thought a sense
of the inherent unity of the law of persons, the family, property, con-
tracts, torts, and inheritance. 12 The term "civil law" is sometimes used
among common-law attorneys, most often in contrast to criminal law.
Also, many common-law lawyers recognize that the law of persons, the
family, contracts, torts, and inheritance are the most basic subjects of
civil law. In civil-law countries, however, civil law has traditionally
been distinguished not only from criminal law but also from commer-
cial law.'2 9 For example, the five seminal French codes were the Code
civil (Civil Code of 1804), the Code deproc.dure civile (Code of Civil
Procedure of 1806), the Code de commerce (Code of Commerce of
1808), the Code de procdure pknale (Code of Criminal Procedure of
1811), and the Code pknale (Penal Code of 1811).13"
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the common law
of contract effectively absorbed the mercantile law. As a result, com-
mercial law in England consists only of the application of common-law
rules of contract to commercial transactions.' 3' The typical common-
POWER xi (2d ed. 1965). On Soviet and socialist federalism generally, see R. SCHiLESINGER,
FEDERALISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (1945). As Professor Osakwe has pointed
out, Soviet federalism was a response to the Soviet Union's enormous nationality problem.
Official ideology suggests that Soviet federalism will be dismantled in favor of a completely
unitary state when there has been a complete fusion of nationalities and ethnic groups.
Osakwe, The Theories and Realities of Modern Soviet Constitutional Law: An Analysis of the
1977 USSR Constitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1350, 1406-07 (1979). The 1977 constitution
already speaks of the "one Soviet people" which has now been forged. See id at 1355, 1406.
In many respects, however, Soviet federalism does seem to resemble United States federal-
ism. Id at 1406-10.
127. The commentators who have remarked on this fact are too numerous to list, See,
e.g., DAVID, supra note 1, at 70; ZWEIGERT & K5'z, supra note 2, at 59; Malmstrm, sira
note 2, at 140. This is undoubtedly a function of the importance of the individual and of
private relations in the Western conception of law. See generally supra text accompanying
notes 107-12.
128. See MERRYMAN, supra note 21, at 7-11.
129. See, e.g., Szladits, The Civil Law System, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 70-71 (R. David ed. 1974); WEILL & TERRt, supra note 52, at 61, 63,
130. F. LAWSON, A. ANTON & L. BROWN, AMOS AND WALTON'S INTRODUCTION TO
FRENCH LAW 18 (3d ed. 1967).
131. For the best discussion of the treatment accorded to the civil-law/commercial-law
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law lawyer probably still conceives of commercial law as a branch of
the civil law, but modem forces have blurred this distinction as well.
In the United States, the existence of the Uniform Commercial Code
creates the impression that commercial law is a distinct body of law. In
England, commercial law also has its own distinctive flavor.'3 2 In
France, there is still a separate commercial law, but very little of it is
contained in the Code de commerce (Commercial Code).133 Switzer-
land and Italy no longer make the civil/commercial distinction in the
structure of their codes: Italy has a civil code which includes commer-
cial law, and Switzerland has a separate code of obligations, covering
what the French and Germans would think of as both civil and com-
mercial obligations. 134 There is an apparent tendency on the Continent
for modem civil law to absorb commercial law. Civil law is becoming
synonymous with private law as a whole. 135 This trend is more in line
with the way the common-law attorney would define "civil law" as a
category. The commercial-law/civil-law dichotomy is more important
in civil-law countries than in common-law countries, but the gap be-
tween common law and civil law in this regard is not wide.
4. The Traditional Branches of Private Law
Everywhere in the West, private law is the most traditionally fun-
damental subject of study, especially its core of property, contract, and
tort. That these three subjects have so transfixed Western lawyers is
probably an indication of the importance of the individual and private
enterprise in the Western conception of law. That they continue to be
so important is perhaps unfortunate in view of the growth of the mod-
em administrative welfare state in the West. 3 6 Although the common-
law lawyer and the civil-law lawyer join in their attachment to these
three fundamental categories, the civilian thinks of torts (delicts) and
contracts as being but two subdivisions of the larger subject of obliga-
tions, a typifying structural feature of civil-law systems which has no
real counterpart in common-law systems.137 The issue whether to in-
clude the category of civil procedure among the major divisions of pub-
distinction in common law, see Weir, The Common Law System, in 2 INTERNATIONAL EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 103-13 (R. David ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Weir].
132. Id at 111.
133. Tallon, supra note 63, at 34-35.
134. DAVID, supra note 1, at 90-91.
135. MERRYMAN, supra note 21, at 108. But see DAVID, supra note 1, at 91.
136. In this regard, see the lament of a teacher of public law, Ogus, supra note 51, at 42.
137. DAVID, supra note 1, at 84-85.
19821
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
lic or private law has arisen in both common-law1 38 and civil-law
systems.' 39 Both regard civil procedure and criminal procedure as the
two major divisions of procedural law. However, due to the impor-
tance of the jury in common-law procedure, the law of evidence is a
central procedural category here, whereas it is of relatively little impor-
tance in civil-law systems.
140
B. Pervasive Concepts
The pervasive concepts of typical Western legal systems also show
fundamental similarities. There are, however, few if any thorough
comparative studies of the conceptual frameworks of major subjects of
Western law. Consequently, the following remarks are tentatively
made.
Many of the most basic conceptual components of the law are
found throughout the West: obligation, rights,' rights in rem, 142 rights
in personam,143 and the concept of the legal rule itself. 44 Other funda-
mental concepts which run through Western law include act, intention,
capacity, consent, will, person, personality, thing, fact, demand, excep-
tion, interest, and association. 4 5 There are many others. Although
138. PATON & DERHAM, supra note 117, at 329.
139. WEIL & TERRA, supra note 52, at 1 58 n.2.
140. DAVID, supra note 1, at 363. As previously mentioned, the law/equity distinction in
the common law distinguishes common-law from civil-law legal systems, but the importance
of the distinction has diminished in the last century. It remains, but will probably continue
to diminish steadily in importance until some future generation of lawyers recognizes it no
more; see supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
141. In French, droft subjectif See, e.g., WEILL & TERRA, supra note 52, at 1168-72.
The Italian equivalent is dirito soggetivo. See, e.g., A. TRABUCCHI, ISTITUZIONE DI DIR-
ITTO CIVILE 7-8 (21st ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TRABUCCHI].
142. Droits rkels, WEILL & TERRA,supra note 52, at I 243; d'r//il reall, TRAIJUCCII, sl vra
note 141, at 53-54.
143. Droitspersonnels, WEILL & TERRA, supra note 52, at 11 246-247; dir/it di obblga-
zione, TRABUCCHI, supra note 141, at 53-54.
144. See DAVID, supra note 1, at 92-99, 365-71.
145. For comparative purposes, it would be interesting to set a modern structuralist phi-
losopher to work on a linguistic and conceptual analysis of such concepts as they appear in
the law of selected common-law and civil-law countries. Such a study might analyze the
broader intellectual history of their many meanings in different contexts. The outcome of
such a study might be that these concepts would be found to have a fundamentally similar
content with common cores of meaning, but with important differences in shading and pe-
ripheral usage. For example, though no comparatist could assume that a French lawyer
meant by rbglejuridique what a United States lawyer meant by the term "legal rule," the
central similarity of the two would justify their inclusion in one conceptual family. An effec-
tive elucidation of these concepts might ultimately describe the Western conception of law.
For a discussion of structuralist thought in anthropology, linguistics, history, and literature,
see STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE: FROM LEvI-STRAUSS TO DERRIDA (J. Sturrock ed. 1979).
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any such study has yet to be done, an analytic history of these concepts
would doubtlessly reveal that they have appeared in so many different
contexts in Western law because they encapsulate some enduring
meanings in Western legal thought. In all likelihood, an effective eluci-
dation of these concepts would ultimately describe the Western concep-
tion of law. In any case, this undertaking would provide a valuable
line of inquiry into the macrocomparative classification of common-
law and civil-law legal systems.
While certain basic concepts form a pool from which the Western
legal systems have drawn, other concepts, especially complex doctrinal
ones, serve to distinguish common-law from civil-law systems. For ex-
ample, the common-law concept of the trust has no civil-law
equivalent."4  The civil-law juridical act has no common-law
equivalent. Consideration in the common law of contract is not the
same as cause in the civil law of contract.1 47 Such doctrinal concepts
illustrate the distinct conceptual frameworks within which common-
law and civil-law attorneys handle legal problems.' 48 These doctrinal
distinctions suggest again that it would be wise to preserve a common-
law/civil-law subdivision in any larger grouping of Western liberal
democratic legal systems. The possibility, however, of a larger Western
grouping is not ruled out. Upon closer investigation it may turn out
that many conceptual dissimilarities in doctrine mask conceptual simi-
larities in theory. Tort and delict may be one such case. 49 It would be
absurd to suppose that all differences will dissolve upon close inspec-
tion, but minor technical distinctions are more appropriate for
microcomparative than for macrocomparative studies.'5 0
146. See ZWEIGERT & KrTz, supra note 2, at 274-84.
147. For a good general introduction to the concept of the juridical act, see MERRYMAN,
supra note 21, at 81-84. See also WEILL& TERRI, supra note 52, at 11 313-41; TRABuccill,
supra note 141, at 130-33.
148. But see Markesinis, Cause and Consideratior 4 Study in Parallel, 37 CAMBRIDGE
L-. 53 (1978), for a persuasive argument that the two concepts are nonetheless parallel in
many respects.
149. Markesinis, The Not So Dissimilar Tort and Delict, 93 L.Q. REv. 78 (1977).
150. It should also be observed that some of the major legal categories discussed above,
see supra text accompanying notes 115-139, reflect the importance of certain metalegal con-
cepts, that is, certain fundamental social concepts which appear pervasively in Western law.
Property and contract are the two most obvious, and their great importance in common law
and civil law distinguishes the Western legal systems from all other contemporary families
of legal systems. The same could also be said of the concept of a constitution and of a
number of other pervasive Western legal concepts with wider social importance.
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C. Law and Western Languages
There are also important similarities among the languages of
Western law, although this topic has received little comparative analy-
sis. Most comparatists have simply noted that cognate legal terms in
Western languages often carry different meanings, a caution to be ob-
served carefully when reading and translating foreign law."1' The mere
existence of this problem of cognate words reveals something about the
linguistic backgrounds of the languages of Western law. In studying
the legal systems outside the West, similarities of language are much
less commonly found, because the degree of linguistic difference is so
much greater. 152 The languages of Western law-the most important
of which are English, German, French, Italian, Spanish, and Latin-
are the languages of Western civilization. All have descended from an
older common ancestor or ancestors, and all have been used in cultures
which have had long and close associations in history, enabling them to
borrow from one another. A study of the forms and derivations of the
vocabularies of Western legal systems conducted by a modern histori-
cal linguist might well uncover reasons to classify these vocabularies as
one Western group. Linguistic structures are the law's most basic struc-
tures, so this is another interdisciplinary line of inquiry which would be
invaluable in comparing entire legal families. 15
3
VI. INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS
Upon examining the institutional settings of common-law and
civil-law systems, convergence is once again found. In the West, the
rise of the welfare state and the growth of modem movements for so-
cial reform through law have resulted in a proliferation of legislation
and administrative regulation with the consequence that public law
now outweighs private law in importance. In the common-law coun-
tries, this phenomenon has enhanced the status of statutes relative to
151. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 815-27 (4th ed. 1980) [hereinafler cited as
SCHLESINGER]; DAVID, supra note I, at 341. Dual meanings are not unknown even in com-
mon law, the one family of legal systems based on a common language, English. For exam-
ple, "Attorney General" has different meanings in English and United States law. DAVID,
supra note 1, at 430.
152. SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 817.
153. For example, the various types of interest in real property are represented in the
West by abstract nouns; by contrast, however, the Akan, a major tribe in Ghana, represent
property interests by verbs. A. ALLOTT, LAW AND LANGUAGE 28 (1965) (inaugural lecture
delivered on March 2, 1965, at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London).
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judicial decisions. In the civil-law countries, it has compromised the
traditional ideal of codification.
A. Source-of-Law Theory
It might once have been maintained that civil-law systems are
codified legal systems while common-law systems are systems of deci-
sional law.'54 This traditional dichotomy of systems of codes and sys-
tems of precedent has produced a massive literature contrasting
"source-of-law theory" in common- and civil-law systems.
The modem civil-law ideal of codification may be traced to Justin-
ian, whose Corpus Zuris Civilis was intended as a sweeping reform of
Roman law. 55 The later European Romanists, especially the human-
ists and the natural lawyers of the Enlightenment, also saw codification
as a way to modernize and rationalize the law into a systematic and
self-sufficient repository of legal principle. Ideally, the law of a civil-
law country should be entirely contained in a handful of complete, co-
herent, and clear codes.' 56 Like many other ideals, this one has eluded
attainment.
The law in common-law countries, by contrast, has not been de-
vised as a complete, rational system brought into existence by an act of
legislation. Rather it has developed by the gradual accretion of partic-
ular precedents made binding for the future by the doctrine of stare
decisis. 15 7 The civil-law lawyer, it might be said, applies the law to a
case by finding the relevant code provision, applying it to the particular
case, and deducing the result logically therefrom. The common-law
lawyer, by contrast, applies the law to the case by finding another case
decided under the same or similar circumstances, discovering its ratio
decidendi, and applying the ratio analogically to reach a result.
These images of common-law and civil-law source-of-law theory
are of course highly caricatured, and much recent comparative study
154. "[T]wo great systems of law," Lord Macmillan boldly proclaimed, "divide the civi-
lized world, the system of codified law and the system of case law." ("Les deux grands
syst~mes de droit qui se partagent ainsi le monde civilis6, le systtme du droit codifi6 ct le
systime du droitjurisprudentiel. ... ) Macmillan, Deux Manibresde Penser, in 2 INRO-
DUCTION A L'ETuDE DU DROrr COMPARE RECUEIL o'ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR D'EOoUARD
LAMBERT 3, 6 (1938 reprinted 1973) [hereinafter cited as Macmillan] (translated from a
lecture delivered by Lord Macmillan at the University of Oxford, May 9, 1934) (English
quotations are translations from a translation).
155. See generally HonorS, The Background to Justinian'r Codification, 48 TuL. L REv.
859 (1974).
156. MERRYMAN, supra note 21, at 27-34 discusses European ideologies of codification.
157. A classic work on the doctrine of stare decisis is R. CRoss, PRECEDENT IN ENGUSH
LAW (3d ed. 1977).
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has been devoted to demonstrating just how unreal they are today.
"[T]he technical expression of Western law has tended to converge to-
wards a mixture of codes or partial codes, specialized statutes of a het-
erogeneous character, and reported judicial decisions which in their
own terms, or as handled by academic legal commentators, fill out and
develop the basic law."' 58 Today, important statutory law in Europe is
to be found less and less in codes properly so called and more and more
in ordinary legislation. The authority of legislation as a whole has lost
its supereminence, and important bodies of law are almost entirely
judge-made. As a result, European lawyers have begun to treat judicial
decisions, at least when they form a jurisprudence constante, 5 9 as an
increasingly independent and important source of authority. A Euro-
pean judge will follow the relevant decisions of the highest courts much
as an Anglo-American judge will. Although there are still differences
in the role of judicial decisions in common-law and civil-law countries,
commentators seem to agree that these differences are more a matter of
detail than of basic principle or common practice. 160 In the common
law, legislation is becoming more important and has probably sur-
passed case law as a source of law reform.161 The common-law lawyer
is also becoming familiar with more systematic, abstract, and compre-
hensive formulations of law which resemble codes in some respects.
62
The modern penchant for social regulation through law has also
inflated the body of the law everywhere in the West beyond measure,
and this accounts for the pervasive, if informal, authority of the treatise
as a source of law. In England, on the Continent, and in the United
States, lawyers expect treatises to provide a systematic and thorough
development of the law relevant to a given subject, which they might
otherwise have to collect from many scattered sources. In the United
States, the burgeoning law of fifty-one interrelated sovereigns has
called forth the American Law Institute's project of restatements of the
law governing important common-law subjects. As Professors
158. Sawer, supra note 48, at 47.
159. Jurisprudence constante might loosely translate as a judicial repetition of similar
decisions. The French refers to a group of cases standing for the same legal rule. See gener,
ally SCHLESINGER, supra note 151, at 574-75. For an extended discussion of the judicial
decision in Continental legal systems, see THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOC-
TRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS (J. Dainow ed. 1974); for a discussion by
two representative French civilistes who recognize the authoritative force of judicial deci-
sions as a source of law, see WEILL & TERR9, supra note 52, at 196-226.
160. See, e.g., DAVID, supra note 1, at 132.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 164-65.
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Zweigert and Kitz have noted, "Restatements are rather like the civil
law codes in their systematic structure of abstractly-formulated rules,
and in many cases the continental jurist can use them as a means of
easy access to the rules of American private law in the first instance."' 63
The converse is also true: the United States lawyer who has become
familiar with the systematic orderliness of the Restatements' should
probably not have much difficulty picking up the orientation and sys-
tem of European codes. Common law and civil law alike seem to rely
on legal scholarship for comprehensive, systematic, and authoritative
syntheses of the law.
B. Judicial Method
The older image of a "judge-proof' mechanistic application of the
codes has been abandoned, and most European commentators today
recognize the "legislative" functions of the judiciary. This develop-
ment may date to the famous Article I of the Schn'eizerisches
Zivilgesetzbuch (Code civil suisse, Codice civile svizzero, Swiss Civil
Code)'65 which provides that
legislation governs all matters to which the letter or the spirit of one
of its provisions refers.
In default of an applicable legislative provision, the judge rules
in accordance with customary law and, in default of custom, accord-
ing to the rules he would establish if he had to act as a legislator.
He draws upon solutions sanctioned by legal scholarship and
case law.'
66
163. ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 2, at 257.
164. The authority of the Restatements is only persuasive; they have been highly
persuasive, however. As of April, 1976 over 55,000 appellate decisions had cited
the Restatements [and had applied the Restatement rule in "nearly 98 percent of
the decided cases mentioning the Restatements"]. Few courts which cite the Re-
statement explicitly reject the Restatement rule. It would seem that the Restate-
ments are becoming accepted as the authoritative statement of the common law of
the United States. On the other hand, many aspects of the law covered by the
Restatements have not been covered in state decisions citing them, so that categori-
cal statements should be made with great caution.
M. PRICE, H. BITNER & S. BYSIEWicZ, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 278 (4th ed. 1979).
165. This is Professor Sawer's thesis. Sawer, supra note 48, at 32.
166. Article 1 provides in full (in the French official version):
Articlepremier La loi r~git toutes les mati~res auxquelles se rapportent la lettrc
ou resprit de 'une de ses dispositions.
A d6faut d'une disposition l6gale applicable, le juge prononce scion le droit
coutumier et, A d6faut d'une coutume, scion les r~gles qu'il 6tablirait s'il avait A
faire acte de legislateur.
I s'inspire des solutions consacr~es par la doctrine et la jurisprudence.
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On the other hand, this change may be nothing more than a belated
recognition of the necessary implication of Article 4 of the Code Napo-
l. On, 167 which made it an offense for a judge to refuse to decide a case
on the ground that no statute applied. 16  Some evidence indicates that
the drafters of the Code Napolkon recognized a certain leeway within
which the judiciary might create law. 169 In any case, European judges
today largely follow the judicial method outlined in Article I of the
Swiss Civil Code.170 It is difficult to imagine how they might do
otherwise.
C. Styles of Legal Reasoning
Many commentators have drawn pictures of the common-law and
civil-law minds from an examination of each system's style of legal rea-
SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH (CODE CIVILE SUISSE, CODICE CIVILE SVIZZCRO) art. 1
(Switz.).
167. The judge who refuses to judge, under pretext of the silence, the obscurity or
the insufficiency of the statutory law, may be prosecuted as guilty of a dbti dejts-
rice [the French dbni dejustice, which may loosely be translated as 'denial of jus-
tice,' has no real English or American equivalent].
In the original: "Le juge qui refusera de juger, sous pr6texte du silence, de l'obscurit6 ou de
l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra etre poursuivi comme coupable de dtni de justice." CODE
CIVIL art. 4.
168. See, e.g., Sawer, supra note 48, at 32.
169. Professors Weill and Terr6 (and many others) quote Portalis, one of the principal
drafters, on this point:
The creative power ofjudicial decisions was, moreover, admitted by the drafters of
the civil code themselves. Portalis, in his Preliminary Discourse, after having
showed that the code had inevitable gaps, added: "the office of statutes is to deter-
mine, in broad strokes, the general maxims of the law; to establish principles rich
in results, and not to descend into the detail of the issues which may arise on each
subject. -It is up to the magistrate and to the jurist, steeped in the general spirit of
the law, to direct their application . . . It would no doubt be desirable if all legal
subjects could have been regulated by statutes. But in default of precise texts on
each subject, an ancient and well established usage, an uninterrupted line of like
decisions, a received opinion or maxim, takes the place of statutes."
In the original:
Le pouvoir crtateur de la jurisprudence a d'ailleurs t6 admis par les r~dacteurs du
code civil eux-memes. Portalis, dans son Discourspr~iiminaire, apr~s avoir montr6
que le code avait des lacunes indvitables, ajoutait: "l'office de la loi est de fixer, par
de grandes vues, les maximes gn6rales du droit; d'6tablir des principes f~conds en
consequences, et non de descendre dans le dtail des questions qui peuvent naltre
sur chaque matifre. -C'est au magistrat et au jurisconsulte, p6n6tr6s de 'espirit
gdn~ral des lois, A en diriger 'application . . . Il serait, sans doute, desirable que
toutes les matifres pussent 8tre r~glfes par des lois. Mais A d6faut do textes precis
sur chaque mati~re, un usage ancien et bien 6tabli, une suite non interrompue de
dcisions semblables, une opinion ou une maxime r6ques, tiennent lieu de loi."
WEILL & TERRt, supra note 52, at 238 n.l.
170. ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 2, at 14, 263-68.
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soning and have thus found a further division between common-law
and civil-law legal systems. The tone of this body of comparative writ-
ing is perfectly captured in Lord Macmillan's famous paper of 1934,
Two Manners of Thinking,17 wherein he hazarded the generalization
that "all human minds, in their ultimate structure, are divided into one
or the other of two types or classes, which are each characterized by
manners of thinking fundamentally different and distinct."'' 2 For
Lord Macmillan, common-law or pragmatic thinking was one such
type, and civil-law or theoretical thinking the other. While Lord Mac-
millan's paper humorously acknowledged that this simple generaliza-
tion was not likely to be true, comparatists have formulated equally
stark and simple propositions to describe common-law and civil-law
reasoning: the common-law lawyer thinks inductively, the civil-law
lawyer, deductively.'7 3 Casuistry typifies common-law thought,
whereas generality typifies civil-law thought. 74 The common-law
mind is traditional, the civil-law mind, rational.' Common-law rea-
soning is concrete, civil-law reasoning, abstract.' 76 The common-law
lawyer's orientation is procedural, the civil-law lawyer's, substantive. 77
Common-law lawyers reason empirically, civil-law lawyers, theoreti-
cally. 78 Common-law thinking is formalistic, civil-law thinking, an-
tiformalistic. 179  Common-law reasoning proceeds by a method of
distinction, whereas civil-law reasoning proceeds by a method of
interpretation. 80
Comparative work in this field commonly begins with this kind of
attack and then makes qualifications. Every Western legal system has
placed a high value upon rationality and systematic order and has
found that legal rules, whether derived from a code or from cases, have
important areas of indeterminacy'"' which permit legal creativity by
171. See generally Macmillan, supra note 154.
172. "[T]ous les esprits humains, dans leur ultime structure, se classent dans run ou
rautre de deux types ou classes, qui se caract6risent chacun par des manitres de penser
fondamentalement diff~rentes et distinctives." Id at 4.
173. Id
174. ZWEIGERT & Kr-z, supra note 2, at 268-72; DAVID, supra note 1, at 98-99; MER-
RYMAN, supra note 21, at 84-85.
175. STEIN & SHAND, supra note 67, at 39.
176. ZWEIGERT & K6Tz, supra note 2, at 262.
177. Id at 208; DAVID, supra note 1, at 325, 361-65.
178. Macmillan, supra note 154, at 4.
179. ZWEIGERT & KrTz, supra note 2, at 64, 66.
180. DAVID, supra note 1, at 368.
181. These areas of indeterminacy are what H.L.A. Hart has called the "open texture" of
law. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 124 (1961). Hart's discussion of this indeterminacy in
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judges. These polar descriptions, in attempting to say something new
about common-law and civil-law reasoning, can be criticized because
they exaggerate and thereby bury any truth under fictitious overstate-
ment. It would be much more accurate to say that the law in every
Western legal system has swung back and forth between these opposing
characteristics of speculative thought. For example, the casuistry of
classical Roman lawyers was echoed by some of the medieval Euro-
pean Romanists and is reminiscent of traditional English casuistry.
English law has had its systematizers, from Bracton to Blackstone. The
systematization and precision of some of the United States Restate-
ments 82 is greater than that of many modern civil-law treatises. It
should be appreciated that the legal thought of both common-law and
civil-law countries today is sufficiently rich to contain a healthy degree
of stylistic variety, ranging from relative casuistry to relative generality
and from relative concreteness to relative abstractness. One is likely to
find a tendency to casuistry in modern common law and a tendency to
systemization in civil law. Also, the folklore of legal reasoning within
the professional legal traditions of common law and civil law enshrines
these archetypical images in a purer form than one ever finds in prac-
tice. Beyond these observations one should not rely on such outdated
polar generalities.
83
Western lawyers are abandoning these older models of legal rea-
soning and are beginning to see legal reasoning in common-law and
civil-law countries as essentially rhetorical. Rhetorical reasoning aims
not at logical proof or scientific discovery but rather at persuasion and
conviction; it rests not on axioms and rules, but rather on appeals to the
community's sense of justice. 84 The search for justice through written
reason in the form of a hierarchy of accepted authoritative sources-
both codified and precedential legal systems is an indispensable reference on this subject; /d
at 121-32.
182. The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (1936) offers a prime example, building as it does
on a set of Hohfeldian definitions.
183. The ability and the desire to characterize Western legal reasoning in these terms
may actually reveal fundamental affinities rather than differences between common-law and
civil-law reasoning. These polar generalities reveal a fascination with logic and forms of
argument not found in many other cultures. It makes almost no sense to ask whether the
judge in a traditional African customary court reasons casuistically or generally when there
are no written records either of cases or of broad principles. Most of these polarities make
sense only as ideal types within the Western conception of law and not outside it.
184. See generally C. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, TRAITL DE
L'ARGUMENTATION, LA NOUVELLE RHiTORIQUE (2d ed. 1970); C. PERELMAN, LOOIQUE
JURIDIQUE, NOUVELLE RHTORIQUE (1976). For a general discussion of the "new rheto.
rics" in the context of a survey of Western legal reasoning, see J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM
AND LAWYERS' REASONINGs 328-37 (1968).
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statutes, cases, legal scholarship, and custom-is probably an accurate
characterization of legal reasoning in both common-law and civil-law
systems. 8 .5 Within this type of legal reasoning, there is obviously room
for a variety of styles. Stylistic differences, however, should not divide
these two legal systems into separate families but rather should mark




The legal professions have also been an area of comparative study.
Many observers, following Weber,"s6 have felt that the most important
distinction between common law and civil law is the distinction be-
tween their professional elites."8 7 Weber began with legal education:
For the development of a professional legal training, and, through it,
of specifically legal modes of thinking two different lines are possible.
The first consists in the empirical training in law as a craft; the ap-
prentices learn from practitioners more or less in the course of actual
legal practice. Under the second possibility law is taught in special
schools, where the emphasis is placed on legal theory and "science,"
that is, where legal phenomena are given rational and systematic
treatment.
88
It is obvious where this line of thought leads: academically taught
civil-law lawyers are trained in the classroom to think like their profes-
sors-rationally, theoretically, generally, and abstractly. Apprenticed
common-law lawyers, however, are trained in the courtroom to think
like their senior colleagues-traditionally, pragmatically, casuistically,
and concretely.
Common-law and civil-law systems, however, have recently con-
185. DAVID, supra note 1, at 105-06, 401.
186. MAx WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 198-223 (M. Rheinstein cd. 1954).
See also supra note 16.
187. See, eg., Rheinstein, supra note 14, at 204. Cf the comments of Professor
Ehrenzweig, who felt that common law and civil law could not be distinguished by civil
law's origin in Roman law, by codification in civil law, by the law-making function of the
judiciary in common law, or by their different types of legal reasoning. The "crucial differ-
ence," he felt, was "in the position of the judge in the two legal orbits, which is not only
reflected in his economic and social status, but vitally important for the making and taking
of all the law." Ehrenzweig, Mlalmstrm's "'S'ystem of Legal S)Stens" An Unartemati
Comment, in 14 ACTA INsTrruTI UPSALIENSIS IURISPRUDENTIAE COMPARATIVAE ME-
LANGES DE DROIT COMPARfi EN L'HONNEUR DU DoYEN AKE MALMSTR6M 73, 76.
188. MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIErY 198 (M. Rheinstein cd. 1954).
1982]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
verged in regard to professional training. While apprenticeship may
once have been the typical form of training for common-law lawyers,
virtually all Western lawyers today are academically trained before
they are exposed to legal practice. The result, as Professor David dem-
onstrates, is that the role of legal scholarship in England today is prob-
ably as great as it is on the Continent. 189 Professors Zweigert and Kbtz
similarly recognize that the style of contemporary United States law is
largely the work of United States legal scholars.190 It must be recog-
nized, however, that civil-law lawyers have been trained in universities
since the eleventh century, whereas the primacy of university legal edu-
cation in common-law systems is fairly recent. As a result, common
law still shows signs of having been developed by practitioners rather
than professors; one such sign often held up for comparative scrutiny is
the importance of common-law forms of action in shaping modem sub-
stantive private law.191 Even so, as long as Western legal education
continues to be a university education, these lingering vestiges of the
different forms of education in common-law and civil-law legal profes-
sions may be expected to recede.
2. The Judiciary
Many commentators have also differentiated the position of judges
in common-law and civil-law countries.' 92 In civil-law countries, the
judge is almost invariably a career civil servant who expects to rise in
the ranks by diligent effort in his job. It is fairly rare for a civil-law
judge to have been chosen for the judiciary after a distinguished career
as a private practitioner. For this reason, and for other important his-
torical reasons, the civil-law judge tends to be a less prominent social
figure than the common-law judge. The structure of the judiciary in
civil-law systems also enforces a certain anonymity, for only in the
most unimportant cases does the civil-law judge sit alone. Moreover,
as a member of a panel, the civil-law judge in many countries is not
permitted to deliver dissenting opinions.1 93 In civil-law countries there
is generally a greater number of professional judges relative to the
number of trained jurists as a whole than in common-law countries.
189. See DAVID, supra note 1, at 399.
190. ZWEIGERT & K Tz, supra note 2, at 254.
191. See, e.g., DAVID, supra note 1, at 323-25; ZWEIGERT & KOYrz, supra note 2, at 208-
09.
192. See, e.g., DAVID, supra note 1, at 139-40; MERRYMAN, supra note 21, at 35-39;
ZWEIGERT & K6Tz, supra note 2, at 117, 223.
193. ZWEIGERT & K6Tz, supra note 2, at 117.
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Socially these judges are bureaucrats, functionaries of the state.19 The
status of the civil-law judge contrasts strikingly with the powerful posi-
tion held by the common-law judge. Thus, judicial roles represent an
important distinguishing feature between common-law and civil-law
systems.
3. Summary
Beyond these broad generalizations, there is a great deal of variety
among legal systems with respect to the professional functions, career
structures, and social roles of trained jurists. This variety suggests that
a common-law/civil-law subdivision may be appropriate within the
Western legal family.
E. Courts
Courts and procedures form another set of institutions which has
received substantial comparative attention. For example, the civil-law
court of cassation, the court of last resort in civil and criminal cases,
has often been singled out as an institution quite unlike the highest
courts of appeal in common-law countries. 9 5 Here too, civil-law and
common-law theory have markedly converged during the last two
centuries.
In every Western system, there is a court of last resort reviewing
questions of law196 in order to assure the uniformity of court decisions,
clarify difficult or uncertain legal questions, and modernize the law.
97
The French Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation or highest court of
ordinary jurisdiction) remands a case whose judgment it has over-
194. DAVID, supra note 1, at 140.
195. See, e.g., MERRYMAN, supra note 21, at 40-43, 128-29; ZWEiGERT & KTz, supra
note 2, at 112-16.
196. This situation did not always exist. In 1790, in reaction to the powers or courts
under the ancien regime, the Tribunal de cassation was created as a special quasi-legislative
body which would have no power to actually decide the cases submitted to it. The Tribunal
de cassation could only overturn erroneously decided cases and send them back to an ordi-
nary court for the entry of judgment. Thus, the Tribunal could not deliver authoritative
interpretations of the applicable law, nor would the courts to which cases were remanded be
bound by its decisions. In this way, its function would be legislative and it would serve as
the final arbiter of difficult questions of statutory interpretation. This fiction, however, dis-
appeared quickly. It was soon accepted that the tribunal would indicate how the lower
courts had erred and what the correct legal principles were. MERRYMAN, .upra note 21, at
41-42. In 1804, the Tribunal was renamed the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation). Bel-
let, France: La Cour de Cassation, 30 R.I.D.C. 193, 194 (1978).
197. Tunc, Synthise" La Cour Judiclaire Suprane, Une Enquie Comparative, 30
R.I.D.C. 5, 13-14 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Tunc].
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turned to a lower court for decision. Although the lower court is not
formally bound by the higher court's decision, lower courts do not in
fact frequently deviate from the interpretation of the law rendered by
the Cour de cassation. When lower courts do deviate, a second recourse
to the higher court will result in a judgment that is formally binding on
them. The more modern European high courts come even closer to the
prevailing Anglo-American practice regarding courts of last resort.
The interpretations of the Italian Corte di cassazione (court of last ap-
peal)'98 are formally binding upon the lower courts on first remand.
The German high court, the BundesgerichIshof (the federal court ofjus-
tice),199 like typical Anglo-American supreme courts, has the full power
to decide a case and enter judgment without remanding it if no further
questions of fact require decision. In civil-law terms, the German court
is a court of revision, not a court of cassation.
Certain features of civil law courts of cassation and revision, how-
ever, still distinguish them from common-law high courts. The typical
court of cassation or revision does not watch over the entire system of
national courts, as does the House of Lords or the United States
Supreme Court, but only watches over the ordinary civil and criminal
courts. The German Bundesgerichtshof, for example, is one of four im-
portant German high courts. There are also the Bundesverwallungsger-
icht (federal administrative court), the Bundesfinanzhof (federal court
of finances), and the Bundesverfassungsgericht (federal constitutional
court). These are each independent high courts; no appeal from a deci-
sion of one will lie to any of the others. In 1968, a Common Chamber
of these four courts was established to hear cases in which any federal
supreme court wishes to depart from the decision of any other,200
Another feature of civilian high courts not found in typical com-
mon-law high courts is their size and internal structure. The typical
common-law high court has no internal divisions, whereas the typical
civil-law high court has many judges divided among numerous cham-
bers. The German Bundesgerichtshof, for example, has 107 judges sit-
ting in five criminal-law and ten civil-law chambers. 20' The Italian
Corte di cassazione has 295 judges, who are also divided into numerous
198. See generally Sgroi, Cour de Cassation d'Italle, 30 R.I.D.C. 293 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Sgroi].
199. See generally Salger et al., La Cour Fd~rale de Justice de la Rpubl/ique Fdbrale
d'Allemagne, 30 R.I.D.C. 311 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Salger].
200. Id at 313.
201. Tunc, supra note 198, at 31; Salger, supra note 200, at 314.
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civil and criminal sections.2 °2 These are features that suggest an impor-
tant common-law/civil-law distinction within the larger Western
family.
F. Civil Procedure
Because of the absence of a jury in civil litigation on the European
continent, civil procedure has developed along lines quite different
from common-law civil procedure.21 3 In a typical continental civil pro-
ceeding, all the evidence is taken in a flexible series of meetings be-
tween counsel and a hearing judge. Issues are sharpened as counsel
proceed, and surprise is generally not a factor since the hearing may
easily be adjourned to another day to allow further investigation in the
interim. The hearing judge prepares a summary written record, includ-
ing transcripts for another judge who will decide the case on the basis
of this written file and the further arguments and briefs of counsel.
Common-law civil procedure, by contrast, concentrates the evidence-
taking into a trial. It must do so because a jury may not easily be re-
peatedly convened and dismissed over a long period. The trier of fact
decides the case largely on the basis of oral testimony. Continental
civil proceedings tend to be less concentrated and less oral. They also
tend to be less encumbered by formal rules of evidence, a feature at-
tributable to the absence of a jury. All of these factors distinguish con-
tinental civil procedure from its Anglo-American cousin. Continental
criminal procedure also has a significantly different character than
common-law criminal procedure.2'
VII. CONCLUSION
In the institutions of common law and civil law, there are differ-
ences important enough to preserve a sense of common-law/civil-law
distinctiveness, yet enough similarity and convergence to speak in
terms of an encompassing Western family having the common-law and
202. Tunc, supra note 198, at 31; Sgroi, supra note 199, at 297-98.
203. See MERRYMAN, supra note 21, at 120-31, for a brief description; SCHLESINGER,
supra note 151, at 329-493, for a more thorough treatment.
204. For a good general discussion of continental criminal procedure, see MERRYMAN,
supra note 21, at 132-39. Recent debate has arisen over the comparative literature describ-
ing continental criminal procedure and over the degree of similarity between Anglo-Ameri-
can and continental criminal procedure. Goldstein & Marcus, 77te M4yth of Judicial
Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, IIal, and Germany, 87 YALE LJ. 240
(1977); Langbein & Weinreb, Continental CriminalProcedu '"Wfth"and Bealiy, 87 YALE
LJ. 1549 (1978); Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure 87 YALE
U. 1570 (1978).
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civil-law families as its separate and primary members. It must none-
theless be admitted that the similarity and convergence are much
greater in practice than in the minds of lawyers. For instance, the rela-
tive practical importance of cases and statutes throughout the West is
roughly the same, but case analysis still receives too much emphasis in
common-law thought, and statutory interpretation receives a similarly
vestigial overemphasis in civil-law thought. Professional legal tradi-
tions seem in many respects to lag behind changes in the face of the
law. Since professional legal traditions condition the behavior of ju-
rists everywhere, they must be taken into account. The European attor-
neys' professional culture is distinct from that of their common-law
colleagues. °5 Even so, the marked present convergence in actual insti-
tutions and practices has come about principally because common-law
and civil-law societies in the twentieth century closely resemble one
another, and their laws have developed accordingly. This kind of natu-
ral convergence is deeper and more permanent than any convergence
through conscious unification or transplantation of laws20 6 and thus is
likely to continue.
As has been shown, the affinities between common-law and civil-
law legal systems far outweigh their differences. The histories of com-
mon law and civil law are closely related major currents in the larger
stream of Western history. Since the Middle Ages, common-law and
civil-law legal systems have drawn from a common fund of Western
legal ideas, and since the Enlightenment they have so markedly con-
verged that the traditional historical distinctions between them have
greatly diminished. The historical similarities have endowed both fam-
ilies of legal systems with a single ruling set of assumptions about the
place of law in the social order, the form law takes, its proper applica-
tion, and its substance. This Western liberal democratic conception of
law not only joins common-law and civil-law families, but it also effec-
tively sets them apart from the socialist, African, Far Eastern, Islamic,
and Indian legal families. Historical similarities are perhaps also re-
205. MERRYMAN, supra note 21, at 109-19.
206. See J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND
LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS 61 (1978). An excellent recent
discussion of the convergence between common-law and civil-law legal systems concludes
that the most persuasive indication of their convergence is "the extent to which legal systems
in Civil Law and Common Law nations play out the fundamental values of Western cul-
ture," indicating "that the Common Law and the Civil Law are moving along parallel roads,
toward the same destination." Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil
Law and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357, 388 (1981).
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sponsible for formal similarities in contemporary common-law and
civil-law legal systems.
Microcomparative studies of the rules of common-law and civil-
law systems have uncovered a high degree of convergence between
them. Although little work has yet been done, comparative studies of
the larger structures of common-law and civil-law families would prob-
ably also show a high degree of convergence in basic categories and
divisions, pervasive concepts, ano legal terminology. A similar conver-
gence for which recent history is again responsible marks the law in
action-institutions, processes, jurists, and professional traditions-in
common-law and civil-law countries.
All in all, common law and civil law seem to be distinct but con-
verging members of a larger Western liberal democratic family of legal
systems. In fact, the common-law/civil-law dividing line may already
have ceased to exist in the public law of Western liberal democracies,
and the consensus of comparatists seems to be that the Western liberal
democratic legal systems are now dominated by public law.20' Even
though common law and civil law still differ in some respects, if either
family were compared to any other major family of legal systems (so-
cialist, Far Eastern, African, or Islamic) the magnitude of differences
would be far greater. The conclusions to be drawn from this Article are
therefore these: Within the Western liberal democratic family of legal
systems, a common-law/civil-law subdivision exists, but the compara-
tive criteria analyzed here indicate that the family affinities of the com-
mon-law and civil-law systems far outweigh their differences,
demonstrating their common membership in a larger Western taxo-
nomic category.
207. See supra note 123.
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